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UNDOING TIME: A PROPOSAL FOR
COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL
IMPRISONMENT OF INNOCENT
INDIVIDUALS1
MUHAMMAD U. FARIDI, HILLEL HOFFMAN, &
PAUL A. MONTUORI*
INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on a prevalent shortcoming of our criminal
justice system: inadequate compensation for innocent individuals
who were wrongfully imprisoned. After serving time in prison—
both before and after conviction—for crimes that they did not com
mit, these individuals often do not have anywhere to go.2 Friend
ships and familial relationships have gradually deteriorated, the
ability to find decent work has been hindered by a criminal record,
and a chance at having a sustainable livelihood has been lost.
Twenty-four states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government have statutes that provide a mechanism for exonerated
* Muhammad U. Faridi is affiliated with the New York City Bar Association’s
Capital Punishment Committee. Hillel Hoffman and Paul A. Montuori are affiliated
with the New York City Bar Association’s Corrections and Community Reentry
Committee.
1. An earlier version of this article is available on the New York City Bar
Association’s website as a joint report of the Association’s Capital Punishment and
Corrections committees.
2. See Fernanda Santos and Janet Roberts, Putting a Price on a Wrongful Convic
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/
weekinreview/02santos.html.
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individuals to seek compensation.3 Some states have private laws
that provide compensation on a person-by-person basis, while
others provide no compensation whatsoever. This article critiques
the statutory approach taken by those twenty-six jurisdictions and
proposes a statute that adequately accounts for the need to com
pensate the innocent while considering the state’s interests. The
proposed statute reflects the fairest practices at this time. It is
likely that any effective exoneration statute will need continual up
dating to reflect contemporary developments in science and tech
nology and changes in law. Drawing upon a mixture of the best
elements from now-existing laws and certain foundational princi
ples of justice, the proposed statute is both a functioning piece of
legislation for current times and a foundation for future
development.
Part I of this article provides a background on the realm of
wrongful convictions and argues for the need to provide compensa
tion for wrongfully convicted individuals. Then, Part II summarizes
the shortfalls and successes of various state statutes, while providing
a discussion of how various elements of the existing statutory
framework are incorporated into the authors’ proposed statute.
Part III sets forth the full text of the proposed statute, which, the
authors advocate, should be considered by those states that have
yet to adopt a compensation statute or are considering revising
their current statutes.
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

AND THE

NEED

TO

COMPENSATE

Fairness and justice are considered the cornerstones of the
American criminal justice system. But these concepts primarily de
fine the system prior to conviction and incarceration.4 The system
provides specific safeguards for a person accused of a crime: a pro
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,5 an adversarial
3. See infra Part II.
4. These concepts have their underpinnings in Blackstone’s thoughtfully calcu
lated ratio: “[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358 (8th ed., Oxford Clarendon Press 1778);
see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”); VOLTAIRE, ZADIG
150 (Tobias George Smollett trans., Lester G. Crocker ed., Washington Square Press 3d
prtg. 1971) (“[I]t is better to run the risk of sparing the guilty than to condemn the
innocent.”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (cita
tion omitted) (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)) (internal quo
tation marks omitted) (“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
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system of justice,6 a presumption of innocence in a criminal pro
ceeding,7 a right to effective legal counsel,8 a right to a speedy trial,9
a right to a jury trial,10 and a right to equal protection of the law.11
Prior to a citizen standing trial as a defendant before a jury, a multi
tude of events must occur: e.g., the reading of warnings, an explana
tion of rights, the provision of counsel, and the exclusion of
unconstitutional evidence. From these protections, it appears that
the system is geared towards providing fairness and justice to a per
son accused of a crime; cases such as Miranda v. Arizona,12 Gideon
v. Wainwright,13 and Mapp v. Ohio 14 symbolize these efforts.
Yet despite the protections afforded by what appears to be a
fair and just system,15 innocent people are sometimes sent to prison.
Eyewitness misidentification, unreliable science, false confessions,
governmental misconduct, evidence obtained from informants and
jailhouse snitches, and ineffective assistance of counsel are the leadand used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.”).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“We have elected to
employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues
before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated
if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.”).
7. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axio
matic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration
of our criminal law.”).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). But see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitu
tional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Require
ment, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455-60 (1996) (illustrating cases of ineffective assistance of
counsel where courts have not found the Sixth Amendment to have been violated).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)
(“Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in
the administration of justice.”).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that certain warnings must
be read to a person in custody prior to interrogation).
13. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that, in accordance with
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, states must provide counsel for an indigent de
fendant accused of a crime).
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in viola
tion of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded).
15. Needless to say, even this system has many flaws. But to list them here is
beyond the scope of this particular examination.
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ing causes of wrongful convictions.16 Hundreds of individuals have
been exonerated after being convicted of crimes that they did not
commit. Exonerations are on the rise, partly due to recent scientific
advancements in DNA testing.17 For example, DNA evidence ulti
mately proved the innocence of Steven Barnes, Timothy Cole, and
Joseph Fears, Jr., who had served nineteen,18 thirteen,19 and
twenty-five years in prison,20 respectively. According to the Inno
cence Project, there have been 273 exonerations due to DNA evi
dence, 206 of which have occurred since 2000.21 Even more
troubling is the fact that seventeen DNA exonerations occurred in
16. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Editorial, True and Un
true Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
01/12/opinion/12sat2.html (noting that police interrogations and confessions are a lead
ing cause for false convictions).
17. Edward K. Cheng, Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA Lens, 60 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 649, 649 (2005) (“In recent times, no development has transformed
the practice of criminal justice as much as DNA evidence. In little over fifteen years,
DNA profiling has produced nothing short of a paradigm shift.”); Samuel R. Gross et
al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL
OGY 523, 523 (2005) (referring to the first DNA exonerations as “the beginning of a
revolution in the American criminal justice system. Until then, exonerations of falsely
convicted defendants were seen as aberrational. Since 1989, these once-rare events
have become disturbingly commonplace.”).
18. Rocco LaDuca, It’s Official: Barnes Exonerated on All Charges, UTICA OB
SERVER-DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://www.uticaod.com/news/x497784091/
Its-official-Barnes-exonerated-on-all-charges.
19. Elliott Blackburn, Judge Exonerates Timothy Cole, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J.,
Apr. 7, 2009, available at http://lubbockonline.com/stories/040709/loc_426805642.shtml
(noting that Timothy Cole died in prison on December 2, 1999, almost ten years before
he was exonerated by DNA evidence).
20. Geoff Dutton & Mike Wagner, Savoring His First Taste of Freedom, COLUM
BUS DISPATCH, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/lo
cal/2009/03/11/FEARS_FREE.ART_ART_03-11-09_A1_G1D6LE7.html.
21. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); see also About
the Organization, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/9.
php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). Further, in March 2011, Houston prosecutors formally
asked a court to exonerate George Rodriguez after DNA tests ruled out his guilt in a
rape for which he served 17 years in prison. Man Who Served 17 Years Was Innocent of
Rape, DA Says, CNN.COM (Mar. 2, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-02/justice/
texas.rape.exoneration_1_dna-tests-new-dna-texas-man?_s=PM:CRIME. Mr. Rodri
guez was released in 2004 after an appeals court found that faulty scientific evidence
had been used against him in his 1987 trial. Id. New DNA tests on certain forensic
evidence ruled out Mr. Rodriguez as the perpetrator. Id. While Texas state officials
originally denied a pardon, Harris County District Attorney Patricia Lykos agreed to
review the case. Id. In discussing the matter, Ms. Lykos stated
[w]hen this scientific inquiry began, there was no legal requirement or man
date for any further work to be done by our office, because the case had been
dismissed . . . . Instead, we acted on the most important obligation of all—to
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death penalty cases after the exoneree served time on death row.22
The Innocence Project has also calculated the average length of the
time served by an exoneree to be thirteen years; a total of 3,524
years served by innocent people.23
Another notable study has identified 340 wrongful convictions,
196 of which did not involve DNA evidence.24 The study notes that
more than half of these 340 exonerees served more than ten years
in prisons, about 80% had been imprisoned for at least five years,
and the total years in prison for all 340 individuals has been calcu
lated at 3,400 years.25 A 1987 study identified 350 cases of wrongful
conviction: 326 in which the defendant was convicted of a homicide
and twenty-four in which the defendant was sentenced to death for
the crime of rape.26 This rise in exonerations has led to reform ef
forts in several states that seek to give prisoners access to DNA
testing.27
To some, the fact that a person is exonerated—even after serv
ing years on death row or otherwise in prison or jail—is evidence of
the fact that the “system” works.28 To others, these exonerations
see that the truth emerges, and that justice is done. Today, we can state that
an innocent man has been vindicated.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 21. There have been
138 death penalty exonerations since 1973. Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412 (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012).
23. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 21.
24. Gross, supra note 17, at 524.
25. Id.
26. Karen F. Parker et al., Racial Bias and the Conviction of the Innocent, in
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 117 (Saundra D. Westervelt
& John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (listing various studies on exonerations and racial
bias).
27. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, No. 08-6, slip
op. at 7-8 (U.S. June 18, 2009) (holding that a prisoner has no federal constitutional
right to post-conviction access to the state’s evidence for DNA testing); Solomon
Moore, DNA Exoneration Leads to Change in Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007,
at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE2DE1438F932
A35753C1A9619C8B63 (“State lawmakers across the country are adopting broad
changes to criminal justice procedures as a response to the exoneration of more than
200 convicts through the use of DNA evidence.”).
28. This is the approach taken by Justice Scalia. For instance, in a concurring
opinion, the Justice noted:
[r]eversal of an erroneous conviction on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning
of an innocent condemnee through executive clemency, demonstrates not the
failure of the system but its success. Those devices are part and parcel of the
multiple assurances that are applied before a death sentence is carried out.
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mean that our system has failed.29 Nevertheless, the question re
mains: what can the system do after an innocent individual has been
exonerated?
The paramount objective for a wrongfully imprisoned individ
ual is obtaining physical freedom. Yet, in order for the system to be
equitable as a whole, it is necessary that the exoneree be monetarily
compensated. A just government cannot wrongfully deprive its citi
zens of life, liberty, or property without compensation. Some juris
dictions have enacted statutes, attempting to assist exonerees with
monetary and other compensation. It is fully appropriate that the
state provides compensation. It is generally accepted that mistakes
are an inherent part of a large criminal justice system. Given that
society as a whole accepts this risk of error in order to maintain
public safety, “the loss when [an error] occurs should be borne by
the community as a whole and not by the injured individual
alone.”30
Most exonerees, especially those who have served a substantial
amount of time in prison, struggle to find housing and work after
their release from prison.31 In some states, more assistance is pro
vided to parolees than to exonerees.32 A lack of uniformity exists
in state and federal laws dealing with compensation. This is due in
no small part to the multifaceted nature of the problem. This arti
cle considers the different procedural, economic, and social calcula
tions that must be taken into consideration before “justly”
compensating an innocent individual.
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Elizabeth
Brandenburg, Kansas v. Marsh: A Thumb on the Scale of Death?, 58 MERCER L. REV.
1447, 1457-61 (2007) (discussing Justice Scalia’s concurrence); David Grann, Trial by
Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann.
29. See, e.g., Bruce P. Smith, The History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 1185, 1186-87 (2005).
30. Edwin M. Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, in 52 AN
NALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 108, 110 (Em
ory R. Johnson ed., 1914).
31. See Jeffrey Chinn & Ashley Ratliff, “I Was Put Out the Door With Noth
ing”—Addressing the Needs of the Exonerated Under a Refugee Model, 45 CAL. W. L.
REV. 405, 407 (2009); Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After
Exoneration, and Justice Is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 138,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/us/25dna.html?pagewanted=all (survey
ing more than 130 DNA exonerees and noting that dozens face severe struggles on their
reentry to society).
32. For more background on life “after exoneration,” see After Exoneration, IN
NOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/After-Exoneration.php (last
visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF EXISTING
COMPENSATION STATUTES

Statutes governing compensation for wrongfully imprisoned in
dividuals have been enacted by 24 states,33 the District of Colum
bia,34 and the federal government.35 The elements that must be
proven or disproved to sustain a claim for compensation, as well as
the scope of a compensation award, vary significantly among these
33. These states are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir
ginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-150 to 165 (LexisNexis
2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102uu
(2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 961 (West Supp. 2011); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c)
(West 2007 & Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:572.8 (Supp. 2011), amended by 2011 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285)
(West); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8241-8244 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN.
& PROC. § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, §§ 1-9 (2008 & Supp.
2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.055 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 541-B:14(II) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to -6 (West 2009); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT
§ 8-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 148-82 to -84 (2009); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.48-.49 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (the constitutionality of a
portion of this statute was placed in doubt by Nelson v. Ohio, 2010 Ohio 1777 (Ct. Cl.
2010)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154 (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)
(Supp. 2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001 to .003 (West 2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 5574 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.10 to 195.12 (2007 & Supp. 2011); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2009). Ad
ditionally, Montana offers educational aid (if exonerated by postconviction DNA test
ing), but no monetary compensation. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2009). These
statutes are available on the website of the Innocence Project, which also provides brief
summaries of each. See Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/news/LawView1.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
34. See D.C. CODE §§ 2-421 to -425 (LexisNexis 2008).
35. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2006); see also Report to the House of Delegates,
A.B.A. SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-10 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/policy/my05108a.pdf [hereinafter ABA Report] (discussing passage and effect
of federal legislation). For a thorough discussion of compensation statutes, see gener
ally the scholarship of Professor Adele Bernhard: Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails:
Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73 (1999) [here
inafter Bernhard I]; Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 703 (2004) [hereinafter Bernhard II]. For model compensation stat
utes, see ABA Report, supra, at 1-10 (urging adoption of compensation statutes, recom
mending statutory provisions, and surveying existing statutes); An Act Concerning
Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, INNOCENCE PROJECT, [hereinafter
Innocence Project: Model Statute], available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/
Compensation08.pdf (last updated Nov. 2007) (comprehensive model compensation
statute); Lauri Constantine et al., Model Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous Convic
tions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 665, 699, 710-713 (2001) [hereinafter Arizona State Law
Journal: Model Act] (model act and commentary prepared by several law students in a
special seminar).
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jurisdictions. But there are certain commonalities or trends. This
section examines several key provisions of current compensation
statutes and makes recommendations on each topic for incorpora
tion into the proposed statute. These topics include: 1) legislative
findings to guide courts and agencies in applying the statute; 2) gen
eral eligibility requirements regarding (a) the loss of liberty and
type of crime for which a term of imprisonment was served, (b)
conduct of the claimant in association with his or her arrest or con
viction, (c) the existence of other criminal convictions, (d) the
method of exoneration, and (e) the establishment of innocence of
the crime of wrongful imprisonment; 3) the procedures for bringing
a compensation claim, including the proper forum and the statute
of limitations; 4) the calculation of the award, including the factors
to be considered and burden of proof in demonstrating damages;
and 5) the procedure permitting an individual whose conviction has
been reversed on procedural grounds to apply for the issuance of a
declaration of actual innocence in order to qualify for
compensation.
A. Legislative Findings in the Statutes of New York, New Jersey,
and West Virginia
1. Statutory Survey
Legislative findings are included in the compensation statutes
of three states: New York,36 New Jersey,37 and West Virginia.38 The
findings express the statutes’ remedial purposes and provide gui
dance as to their intended applications, as well as offering a statu
tory embodiment of legislative history that can guide courts and
agencies.39 The New Jersey legislature, for example,
finds and declares that innocent persons who have been con
victed of crimes and subsequently imprisoned have been frus
trated in seeking legal redress and that such persons should have
an available avenue of redress over and above the existing tort
36. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b.
37. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C.
38. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a.
39. See supra notes 36-38; see also 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 444 (H.B. 4255)
(West) (legislative report emphasizing the sense of immediacy underlying passage of the
Commonwealth’s compensation statute: “Whereas, The deferred operation of this act
would tend to defeat its purpose, which is forthwith to provide a method of compensa
tion for certain erroneous felony convictions, therefore it is hereby declared to be an
emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the public convenience.”)
(referring to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, §§ 1-9 (2008 & Supp. 2010)).
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remedies to seek compensation for damages. The Legislature in
tends by enactment of the provisions of this act that those inno
cent persons who can demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that they were mistakenly convicted and imprisoned be
able to recover damages against the State.
In light of the substantial burden of proof that must be car
ried by such persons, it is the intent of the Legislature that the
court, in exercising its discretion as permitted by law regarding
the weight and admissibility of evidence submitted pursuant to
this section, may, in the interest of justice, give due consideration
to difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time, the death or
unavailability of witnesses, the destruction of evidence or other
factors not caused by such persons or those acting on their
behalf.40

The West Virginia statute makes similar findings, but also includes
“innocent persons wrongly arrested,” though not convicted, among
those who “should have an available avenue of redress over and
above the existing tort remedies to seek compensation for
damages.”41
The insufficiency of current remedies is thus acknowledged di
rectly in the statutes. Although the burden of proof in demonstrat
ing actual innocence is “substantial,” typical evidentiary
requirements may be relaxed to avoid an inequitable result. Over
all, these considerations demonstrate that a compensation statute
represents a meaningful avenue of relief for exonerees.
2. Suggested Approach for Proposed Statute
The proposed compensation statute has been drafted to in
clude similar preliminary findings as those cited in the New Jersey
statute. These findings provide useful guidance to claimants, law
yers, courts, agencies, and other parties interpreting the statute.
B. General Eligibility Requirements and Limitations
While compensation statutes serve obvious remedial purposes,
they generally limit eligibility for compensation to a relatively nar
row class of persons.42 Proof of a wrongful conviction alone almost
40. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1.
41. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(a).
42. See ABA Report, supra note 35, at 1, 5-7 (making recommendations on re
quirements); Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 101-05 (discussing “[c]laim [f]iling
[r]equirements”).
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never entitles one to compensation under these statutes.43 Typical
“conditions precedent” to recovery include requirements that: (1)
the claimant suffered actual imprisonment following the wrongful
conviction for a felony or misdemeanor; (2) the claimant did not
cause or bring about his or her own conviction; (3) the claimant did
not serve a sentence of imprisonment for another conviction con
currently with the wrongful conviction and is not presently serving a
prison sentence; (4) the claimant be exonerated by an executive
pardon or a judicial determination; and (5) an exoneration by judi
cial determination be proven by clear and convincing evidence of
innocence. The proposed statute adopts some of these approaches
while rejecting others.
1. Actual Imprisonment Requirement
a. Statutory survey
Proof that the wrongfully convicted person was actually incar
cerated is required under all existing compensation statutes.44 Most
require that incarceration be followed by a wrongful conviction in
the corresponding jurisdiction.45 For instance, under New York’s
statute, “[a]ny person convicted and subsequently imprisoned for
one or more felonies or misdemeanors against the state which he
did not commit may . . . present a claim for damages against the
state.”46 The District of Columbia Code similarly provides that,
“[a]ny person unjustly convicted of and subsequently imprisoned
for a criminal offense contained in the District of Columbia Code
may present a claim for damages against the District of Colum
bia.”47 Under these and similarly worded provisions in other stat
utes, a person is not eligible for compensation if the sentence
received was other than a term of imprisonment (such as probation)
or if the conviction was set aside prior to serving a prison sentence,
43. See infra Part II.B.5.
44. See supra notes 33-35.
45. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(2) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011). But see
ALA. CODE § 29-2-156 (LexisNexis 2003) (“In order to be eligible to receive compensa
tion for wrongful incarceration a person must: (1) Have been convicted by the State of
one or more felony offenses, all of which the person was innocent, and have served time
in prison as a result of the conviction or convictions; or (2) Have been incarcerated
pretrial on a state felony charge, for at least two years through no fault of his or her
own, before having charges dismissed based on innocence.”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14
2-13a(b) (“Any person arrested or imprisoned or convicted and subsequently impris
oned for one or more felonies or misdemeanors against the state which he did not
commit may . . . present a claim for damages against the state.”) (emphasis added).
46. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(2).
47. D.C. CODE § 2-421 (LexisNexis 2008).
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even if the person was detained prior to conviction (such as where
bail is denied).48
There is greater variation among statutes regarding the classes
of crimes for which a wrongfully imprisoned person may receive
compensation. Some statutes provide compensation exclusively for
imprisonment for felonies,49 and others for both felonies and mis
demeanors.50 Others do not specify the types of crimes, instead re
ferring only to convictions for criminal offenses that resulted in
incarceration in the prisons of the state.51
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
The proposed statute adopts a fair and straightforward formu
lation, recognizing that compensation should be made to persons
wrongfully imprisoned for any crime recognized in the jurisdiction,
regardless of the level of offense. The appropriate level of compen
sation may vary depending on the length and conditions of impris
onment. It is not reasonable to exclude wrongful convictions on the
basis of their designation as misdemeanors, as opposed to felonies,
as this distinction carries some level of arbitrariness.
It is appropriate to exclude compensation for persons who
were never actually imprisoned pre-trial or post-trial. Arguably,
these individuals were permitted to maintain gainful employment
when they were on bail. Statutory compensation must, however, be
provided for individuals who were not convicted but were neverthe
less incarcerated prior to or during trial if these individuals are ac
tually exonerated of the alleged crime under the statutory
48. Such a person, however, might seek redress in a suit for false arrest, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 . See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
49. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-156 (felony or two years pretrial detention for felony
offense); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(C)
(2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2009); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,
§ 154(B)(1), (2)(a) (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011).
50. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(1)(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added)
(“[I]ndividual was charged . . . with the commission of a public offense classified as an
aggravated misdemeanor or felony.”); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(3); W. VA. CODE § 14-2
13a(b). The Iowa Supreme Court has held that “a simple misdemeanor is a public of
fense” for purposes of the state’s compensation statute, but that violation of “municipal
ordinances” do not qualify. Wright v. Cedar Falls, 424 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Iowa 1988)
(citing Wenck v. State, 320 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Iowa 1982)).
51. Among these is the federal compensation statue. 28 U.S.C. § 1495; see also
D.C. CODE § 2-421; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2) (2003); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a) (LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(a) (West
2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(2) (West 2009).
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framework. Although in these situations the exoneree may seek
compensation under state common law torts, such as malicious
prosecution, or federal statutory law, a person exonerated of a
crime that he or she did not commit should not have to suffer
through the numerous procedural hurdles and limitations under
these traditional remedies.
For example, state actors may claim qualified immunity in an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where an exoneree cannot
show that the “official ‘knew or reasonably should have known that
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or [that] he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury.’”52 A simple showing of prob
able cause to initiate a proceeding is a defense to suits for malicious
prosecution and false arrest, even for exonerated individuals.53
Where an exoneree was indicted by a grand jury, a malicious prose
cution claim will be successful only where the exoneree can “estab
lish that the indictment was produced by fraud, perjury, the
suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad
faith.”54
Although some wrongful imprisonments are the product of
malicious or fraudulent state conduct, many are the unfortunate re
sult of good faith failings of the criminal justice system, such as eye
witness misidentifications or inadequate legal representation.
These victims of the system are left without means of relief under
traditional remedies. Further, municipal liability is available under
§ 1983 only in exceptional circumstances, where “the combined acts
or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental pol
icy or custom . . . violate” the plaintiff’s rights.55 An exoneree may
be left to pursue individual prosecutors or police who are unlikely
to have the ability to pay compensatory damages.
52. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (first alteration in original)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
53. See, e.g., Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting
that under New York law, “the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a
claim of malicious prosecution”); Devatt v. Lohenitz, 338 F. Supp. 2d 588, 590 (E.D. Pa.
2004) (stating that a detective who arrested suspect had qualified immunity as to sus
pect’s § 1983 claim alleging improper prosecution, where a reasonable officer could
have found probable cause for arrest, suspect was released once exonerating evidence
arose, and charges against suspect were withdrawn).
54. Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Colon v. City
of New York, 455 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (N.Y. 1983)).
55. Barrett v. Orange Cnty. Human Rights Comm’n, 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir.
1999) (quoting Garcia v. Salt Lake Cnty., 768 F.2d 303, 310 (10th Cir. 1985)).
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States might choose to bar double recovery, but the exoneree
should be permitted to proceed under the statutory framework and
common law torts. The argument that pretrial detention is compar
atively short and is not punitive in nature56 does not account for
situations in which an individual has spent several months—if not
years—in pre-trial detention, only to be later exonerated of the
crime. Concerns that the statute will affect the public fisc, by per
mitting recovery by individuals who were incarcerated pre-trial but
later exonerated of the crime, are valid. Fundamental fairness,
however, requires that all persons who were wrongfully imprisoned
for any length of time—pre-trial or post-trial—be compensated for
the system’s failures.
2. Requirement that the Individual Did Not Cause His
Conviction or Plead Guilty
a. Statutory survey
Seven jurisdictions require that the wrongful conviction and
imprisonment not be attributable to the conduct of the exoneree57
and five require that the individual did not plead guilty to the
crime.58 The District of Columbia has both requirements.59
56. See ABA Report, supra note 35, at 3. As noted in the report:
Some may argue that post-conviction incarceration is no different than time
spent in jail awaiting trial before acquittal. However, pretrial detention is of
relatively limited duration and not intended as punishment. Similarly, incar
ceration before a reversal on direct appeal does not result in compensation,
except in limited circumstances such as when the arrest lacked probable cause.
Again, direct appeal has a predictable timeframe, and many reversals are
based on evidentiary or constitutional violations that vindicate the integrity of
the system, not a determination of innocence. In contrast, most of those who
have been exonerated have spent years protesting their innocence with no re
alistic expectation that collateral attacks on their convictions will be heard, let
alone result in their exoneration.
Id.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4903, 4904 (West
2011); D.C. CODE § 2-422(2) (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2009);
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01
195.10(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(e)(3), (f)(5) (LexisNexis
2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009).
58. See D.C. CODE § 2-425 (LexisNexis 2008) (excepting “Alford pleas” by refer
ring to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(1)(b)
(West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(C) (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.48(A)(2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(b)
(West 2008). For a description of the exception under the District of Columbia statute,
see infra note 64.
59. See D.C. CODE §§ 2-422(2), 2-425.
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The former requirement is most expansively formulated in the
California statute, where “[t]he claimant must prove . . . the fact
that he or she did not, by any act or omission on his or her part,
intentionally contribute to the bringing about of his or her arrest or
conviction for the crime with which he or she was charged . . . .”60
Other jurisdictions take a more limited approach, requiring that the
exoneree did not cause his or her conviction by the exoneree’s own
act or failure to act, or misconduct or neglect.61 The New Jersey,
New York, and West Virginia statutes state it more briefly: the per
son must “not by his own conduct cause or bring about his
conviction.”62
The compensation statutes in Iowa, Massachusetts, Ohio, and
Oklahoma do not contain such a requirement, but limit coverage to
persons who did not plead guilty to the offense charged or to a
lesser included offense.63 The District of Columbia similarly ex
cludes “any person whose conviction resulted from his entering a
plea of guilty.”64 This exclusion exempts guilty pleas entered “pur
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903.
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2); D.C. CODE § 2-422(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01
195.10(B); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4).
62. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(4)(b); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(a); W. VA.
CODE §§ 14-2-13a(e)(3), (f)(5); Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 718 n.85 (collecting New
York State cases where this provision has been used to disqualify claimants). This dis
qualification, according to the drafters of the New York statute,
was intended to require that the person seeking damages . . . establish that he
did not cause or bring about his prosecution by reason of his own miscon
duct[;] . . . such misconduct would include falsely giving an uncoerced confes
sion of guilt, removing evidence, attempting to induce a witness to give false
testimony, attempting to suppress testimony, . . . concealing the guilt of
another,
and even “plead[ing] guilty.” Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 717-18 (quoting N.Y.
STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE
GOVERNOR ON REDRESS FOR INNOCENT PERSONS UNJUSTLY CONVICTED AND SUBSE
QUENTLY IMPRISONED, 1984 N.Y. Laws 2899, 2932).
Some proposed statutes more narrowly define the categories of conduct attributa
ble to the claimant. See Arizona State Law Journal: Model Act, supra note 35, at 711
(commenting that a claimant may be “responsible” where he “presents himself at a
police station, claims to be guilty of a crime, and presents evidence of guilt that police
and prosecutors could not reasonably be expected to discern to be false”); Innocence
Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, § 4(A), (A)(2) (“[a] claimant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that: . . . [h]e did not commit or suborn perjury, or
fabricate evidence to cause or bring about his conviction.”).
63. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(1)(b); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(C);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(b).
64. D.C. CODE § 2-425 (referring to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970)). An “Alford plea” is a “guilty plea that a defendant enters as part of a plea
bargain without actually admitting guilt.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 78 (8th ed. 2004).
This type of plea is different from a plea of nolo contendere in that the defendant ad
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suant to North Carolina v. Alford” because an Alford plea is en
tered to avoid prosecution rather than to admit guilt.65
The District of Columbia statute, unlike the others mentioned
here, apparently draws a distinction between convictions resulting
from a person’s conduct and convictions resulting from guilty pleas.
Six jurisdictions expressly prohibit compensation for persons whose
conduct led to their conviction and do not expressly do the same for
persons who pleaded guilty. It is arguable that guilty pleas would
be subsumed under the attributable conduct category in these juris
dictions.66 If so, persons who pleaded guilty would be barred from
receiving compensation on the ground that their convictions re
sulted from their own conduct. The drafters of the New York stat
ute have interpreted the limitation in this manner.67
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
The proposed statute does not bar compensation because a
person entered a guilty plea or an Alford plea. Innocent individuals
often plead guilty to crimes for a host of reasons, including ineffec
tive assistance of counsel, overwhelming evidence of guilt based on
false confessions or inaccurate forensics, financial and social rea
sons such as to avoid a costly, embarrassing trial, and pressure by
busy defense lawyers and prosecutors.68 Further, a coerced confes
sion, even if not per se unconstitutional, or other self-incriminating
events after the commission of the alleged crime should not disqual
ify a claimant.69 By the same measure, wrongful conduct such as
suborning perjury or fabricating evidence, if occurring following the
mits that sufficient evidence exists with which the government can convince the trier of
fact that the defendant is guilty.
65. See supra note 64.
66. See Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 704. Bernhard explains that some state
statutes “contain inartful language, which permits states to argue that a person who
confessed or entered a plea of guilty should be disqualified from recovering–even if the
confession or plea was clearly false.” Id. The Innocence Project’s proposed statute has
managed to avoid such “inartfulness.” See Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra
note 35, § 4(A)(2) (emphasis added) (“[N]either a confession or admission later found
to be false, nor a guilty plea to a crime the claimant did not commit, constitutes bringing
about his own conviction under this Act.”).
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
68. See Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 720 (explaining that individuals are some
times urged to plead guilty by their attorneys “who may doubt their innocence and fear
the worst outcome after trial” but this does not qualify as the sort of “illegitimate mo
tive” that perhaps could justify disqualification); see also ABA Report, supra note 35, at
7 (the determination of whether a guilty plea bars recovery should be “highly fact
specific.”).
69. According to Bernhard,
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commission of the charged crime, should lead to disqualification.
The proposed statute only bars compensation for individuals who
“by any act or omission related to the conduct of the alleged of
fense at the time and/or place of occurrence of the alleged offense,
or by falsely giving an uncoerced confession of guilt, committing or
suborning perjury, or fabricating evidence, caused or brought about
[their own] wrongful imprisonment.”70 This provision is designed
to prevent large-scale drug dealers, organized crime members, and
drunk drivers from recovering damages if their illegal conduct or
activities contributed to their arrest and conviction, even if they are
innocent of the specific crime charged.
3. Requirement that the Individual Had No Other Sentence
a. Statutory survey
Under some statutes, an individual cannot seek compensation
if he or she served a sentence for an unrelated conviction concur
rently with the sentence for the crime for which he or she was
wrongfully convicted. Further, compensation is barred if an indi
vidual is serving a prison term for a crime other than the crime for
which he or she was wrongfully convicted. New Jersey is represen
tative of this approach.71 Texas has adopted the exclusion for con
current sentences with similar language,72 while Massachusetts and
Oklahoma restate the eligibility condition in terms of incarceration
The mere existence of an inculpatory statement or a confession should never
defeat a claim. Only an uncoerced false confession specifically intended to
distort the truth-seeking function of the police investigation should prevent
recovery. In determining whether a confession was the product of coercion,
courts should presume all false confessions to be the product of coercion un
less they can be shown otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 720. Further, “multiple exonerations prove that innocent
people falsely implicate themselves, despite gaining nothing for themselves in the pro
cess.” Id. at 718 (footnotes omitted). “The fact that a young, mentally challenged,
chemically dependent, submissive, or just plain scared individual succumbs to police
interrogation techniques and confesses to a crime that he or she did not commit no
longer seems like misconduct that should prevent recovery years later when the truth
finally surfaces.” Id. at 720; see also ABA Report, supra note 35 at 1, 7 (advocating that
false confessions should not “automatically bar recovery.”); Compensating the Wrongly
Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://ip.integreat-dev.com/Content/309PRINT.php
(last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (“Statutes should not contain provisions that require exoner
ees to prove that they did not ‘contribute’ to their wrongful conviction,” because, “[b]y
doing so, states avoid restitution to exonerees coerced into confessing to a crime.”).
70. See infra text accompanying note 244.
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-6 (West 2009); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01
195.12(A) (2007 & Supp. 2011).
72. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(b) (West 2011).
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solely for the conviction that is the subject of the compensation
claim.73 The Alabama statute adopts both of the above limitations
and adds a further condition: “A person awarded compensation
and subsequently convicted of a felony crime will not be eligible to
receive any unpaid amounts” of the award.74
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
The proposed statute only bars compensation for an individual
who was serving a concurrent sentence for a crime other than the
crime for which the individual was wrongfully imprisoned.75 It does
not bar recovery for an individual who was convicted of another
crime subsequent to being exonerated.
Barring recovery where an individual served concurrent time
for more than one crime but was only exonerated for one of those
crimes is a sensible limitation, assuming that the individual did not
serve additional time because of the wrongful conviction. It is pos
sible that a person may have received a lesser sentence, or no jail
time at all, had the wrongful conviction never occurred. A fair ap
proach incorporates a rebuttable presumption that some requisite
extra period of incarceration was not caused by the wrongful con
viction.76 Although it can be argued that such an approach is not
feasible in light of the multiplicity of state sentencing practices and
the practical difficulties of rebutting such a presumption, the ABA
Report lays out the groundwork of a just and reasonable approach
which states might revise to accommodate their own sentencing
practices.77 The proposed statute adopts this approach.
The second condition in some state statutes, that the individual
not be currently serving prison time for a separate conviction, also
raises fairness issues.78 The argument for not compensating such
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(C)(v) (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,
§ 154(B)(2)(d) (West 2008).
74. ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(e) (LexisNexis 2003); accord VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01
195.12(A).
75. See infra text accompanying note 242.
76. The ABA Report suggests that the burden of showing “that the claimant
would have otherwise been incarcerated” be “placed on the government.” ABA Re
port, supra note 35, at 1, 8 (“Claimants are eligible for compensation only if, but for this
conviction, the claimant would not have been incarcerated. The government should
have the burden of demonstrating that the claimant would have otherwise been incar
cerated.”); see also id. at 8 (explaining this proposed provision).
77. ABA Report, supra note 35, at 1, 8.
78. Cf. Bernhard II, supra note 35 at 721-22 (arguing that a prior felony convic
tion should not preclude recovery under a compensation statute, but that damages
could be adjusted to provide less to persons with criminal records).

18

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

individuals is that the state should not compensate a known crimi
nal.79 But this rationale does not always correlate to the basic ten
ets of fairness. The proposed statute will compensate those inmates
who serve longer periods of incarceration because of a wrongful
conviction, despite the fact that the inmate is also serving a concur
rent sentence for another crime.
4. Method of Exoneration
a. Statutory survey
There are two ways that wrongfully convicted persons may es
tablish their innocence and qualify for compensation: executive par
don or judicial determination.80 The exoneree may use either
method in nine jurisdictions: Alabama, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, the District of Colum
bia, and the federal government.81 In six jurisdictions, a pardon is
the sole means of establishing innocence: California, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee.82
79. See Fernanda Santos and Janet Roberts, Putting a Price on a Wrongful Con
viction, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/
02/weekinreview/02santos.html (“I believe the taxpayer would be horribly offended if
their money were to be spent compensating an exonerated prisoner who has a history of
serious crimes,” said a state representative in Florida, where “lawmakers have battled
for three years over a compensation plan that would exclude those with prior criminal
histories.”).
80. See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 103-04 (summarizing approaches of differ
ent jurisdictions).
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) (2006); ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-157 to -160(a) (LexisNexis 2003); D.C. CODE § 2-422(1) (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D
§ 1(B) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-4 (West 2009); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(5)(b)
(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(1) (West 2008);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a)(2)(A), (B) (West 2011); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(d)(2)(3) (LexisNexis 2009); see also Rosanna Ruiz, Man Freed
in Rape Fights to Clear Name, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.chron.com/
news/houston-texas/article/Man-freed-in-rape-fights-to-clear-name-1814287.php
(describing how a wrongfully convicted person in Texas was “ineligible for the state
reimbursement of $50,000 for each of the 17 years he served in prison because he ha[d]
not been officially pardoned” or judicially determined to be innocent).
82. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/
8(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2)(c) (2003); MD.
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(b) (LexisNexis 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 148-82 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (2006).
The political aspect of the pardon requirement is demonstrated by the experience
in Illinois. See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 102-03. In the fifty years following this
statute’s enactment, “there were only two successful indemnification claims in the state,
despite the occurrence of many wrongful convictions there.” Id. at 102. When the po
litical climate changed in the late 1990s, more pardons were granted and seven claims
succeeded in just a two-year period. Id. at 102-03.
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There are variations among states in the types of judicial deter
minations required. In Louisiana, the conviction must be reversed
or vacated, and there must be an additional judicial finding of fac
tual innocence.83 New Hampshire refers only to “a person . . .
found to be innocent,”84 and Montana only to convictions set aside
through DNA testing.85 Iowa and Ohio refer to convictions that
are vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal.86
Some states require special determinations of innocence. The
Virginia statute requires that the conviction be “vacated” pursuant
to a writ of actual innocence.87 Wisconsin permits a claims board to
determine a person’s innocence after notice is given to the prose
cuting attorney and the judge who imposed the sentence.88
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
The proposed statute adopts the approach of the nine jurisdic
tions that allow actual innocence to be proven pursuant to either
executive pardon or judicial determination.89 Inclusion of the par
don as a vehicle for establishing innocence accords well with the
conventional discretion of the executive in enforcing laws and ad
ministering sentences. Limiting the manner of proof to pardons
will severely limit the reach of a compensation statute because the
granting of pardons is often dictated by the political climate of the
One federal case upheld the constitutionality of conditioning a compensation claim
on a gubernatorial pardon. See Ross v. North Carolina, No. 5:06-CV-218-D, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 87067, at *16-19, *23 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 31, 2007) (citations omitted)), aff’d,
239 Fed. Appx. 782 (4th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff “allege[d] that providing compensa
tion only to persons receiving a pardon of innocence . . and not to all persons whose
convictions are set aside violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at *17 (emphasis omitted). The court disagreed, explaining that this
prerequisite was “rationally related to making payments only to people whom the Gov
ernor believes are innocent.” Id. at *19. A state may therefore position a pardon as the
exclusive means of proving innocence for eligibility purposes. See id. The court went
on to dismiss a “veritable smorgasbord” of other constitutional claims against North
Carolina’s pardon requirement. Id. at *23. It rejected plaintiff’s contention that the
statute “violate[d] the Establishment Clause because it requires petitioners to seek
‘grace’ from the Governor.” Id. at *16 (emphasis omitted).
83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2011), amended by 2011 La. Sess. Law
Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West).
84. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(II) (2007).
85. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2009).
86. IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(1)(d), (3) (West 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.48(A)(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
87. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011).
88. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(3) (West 2009).
89. “Judicial declarations of actual innocence” are generally considered “judicial
determinations” for purposes of the proposed statute and this article. See supra Part II.
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state and typically hinges on the advocacy efforts of local public
figures such as state legislators.90 In contrast, judicial determina
tion of innocence provides exonerees with a mechanism that may
be less influenced by the political climate of a particular jurisdic
tion. Permitting both of these methods as a means of establishing
innocence assures fairness in the application of the statute while
respecting traditional state prerogatives.
5. Actual Innocence and the Burden of Proof
a. Statutory Survey
Compensation statutes also determine the procedures and re
quirements for establishing innocence. In states utilizing the par
don mechanism of establishing innocence, most require that the
pardon was based on a finding of actual innocence, that the crime
was not committed by the person, or that it was not committed at
all. These limitations and their analogs are included in the statutes
of California,91 Illinois,92 Maine,93 Massachusetts,94 New York,95
North Carolina,96 Oklahoma,97 Tennessee,98 Texas,99 West Vir
ginia,100 District of Columbia,101 and the federal government.102
The burden of proof in arriving at a finding of innocence is usually
not specified. A pardon arising from considerations having nothing
to do with actual innocence may not be relied on to establish a com
pensation claim under these statutes.
90. See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 102 (describing how “the pardon require
ment can be an insurmountable barrier to recovery for deserving claimants because
executive clemency is entirely discretionary.”). Bernhard acknowledges that the par
don requirement will “prevent an undeserving person from obtaining an award,” but
criticizes it on grounds that it “will do little to assist one who is truly innocent but is
unable to rally support with the governor.” Id. at 102-03 (also noting how this require
ment can produce “unanticipated and arbitrary results”).
91. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011).
92. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).
93. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2)(c) (2003).
94. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(B)(i) (2008).
95. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(3)(b)(i) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011).
96. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2009).
97. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(1), (2)(a) (West 2008).
98. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (2006).
99. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a)(2)(A) (West 2011).
100. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2009).
101. See D.C. CODE § 2-422(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(l) (2006); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. &
PROC. § 10-501(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (“An individual is eligible . . . only if the individ
ual has received from the Governor a full pardon stating that the individual’s conviction
has been shown conclusively to be in error.”).
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Where innocence by judicial determination is an option, the
burden of proof is designated more specifically.103 Typically, the
claimant must present “clear and convincing” evidence of inno
cence,104 which is regarded as a substantial burden of proof.105
103. See D.C. CODE § 2-422(2); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(1), (3) (West 1998);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1 (West 2009); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1), (5) (McKinney 1989
& Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(e)(2) (West 2008); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-327.13 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(a), (f) (LexisNexis 2009);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(3) (West 2009). But see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541
B:14(II) (2007) (referring to “a person . . . found to be innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted,” presumably by judicial determination); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (requiring the court of common pleas to find
“that the offense of which the individual was found guilty . . . either was not committed
by the individual or was not committed by any person.”).
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1; see also D.C. CODE § 2-422(2); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 663A.1(1), (3); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1), (5); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,
§ 154(B)(2)(e)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(a), (f);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(3); Arizona State Law Journal: Model Act, supra note 35, at
677 (defining “[a]ctual innocence [to] mean[ ] that a person did not perpetrate the
crime(s) or any lesser included offense(s) at issue in a given case.”).
105. Recently, the Iowa Supreme Court elaborated on the “fact-intensive pro
cess” of proving innocence by clear and convincing evidence:
The burden imposed on a wrongfully imprisoned person is difficult to
meet because it requires the person to prove a negative. . . . Essentially, it
means the person must show he or she was actually innocent of the crime, or
no crime occurred. . . . Thus, . . . it is not enough for the person seeking the
right to sue for compensation . . . to merely establish that a reviewing court
determined the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. Such a
finding only signifies [that] a reasonable fact finder could not be convinced of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When the crime of conviction was commit
ted by someone, the person seeking the right to sue as a wrongfully impris
oned person must affirmatively establish by clear and convincing evidence that
he or she did not commit the crime or any lesser included crime.
Normally, a transcript of the evidence at a criminal trial, by itself, will not
provide the evidence necessary to establish innocence . . . . [A] wrongfully
imprisoned person must establish more than the absence of guilt in law to
establish innocence . . . . The person must be factually innocent, not merely
procedurally free from reprosecution or not guilty.
State v. McCoy, 742 N.W.2d 593, 597-99 (Iowa 2007) (internal citations omitted) (citing
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960); State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428,
433, 435 (Iowa 2006); Hugo Adam Bedau, Michael A. Radelet & Constance E. Putnam,
Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria, Evidence, and Inference, 52 DRAKE
L. REV. 587, 598 (2004) (alterations omitted) (acknowledging that an acquittal or rever
sal of a conviction may constitute an adjudication of “procedural innocence,” but
“[w]hether such a defendant was also factually innocent is a further question never
settled just by the fact that some appellate court correctly found procedural or due
process objections to the defendant’s conviction or sentence”).
The court added that “[t]o prove a negative by clear and convincing evidence, it is
not enough for a wrongfully imprisoned person to merely create questions and doubts
about his or her involvement in the crime of conviction.” Id. at 599. The person must
instead “affirmatively answer those doubts and questions” until there is no serious re
maining belief “about the person’s criminal involvement in the crime of conviction.”
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Louisiana elaborates that factual innocence may be established
through “clear and convincing scientific or non-scientific evidence,”
and defines “factually innocent” as “not [having] commit[ted] the
crime for which [the applicant] was convicted and incarcerated [and
not] commit[ting] any crime based upon the same set of facts used
in his original conviction.”106 Massachusetts uses a “clear and con
vincing evidence” standard, but also requires “grounds which tend
to establish the innocence of the individual.”107
In other states, eligibility turns on whether the prosecutor has
certified innocence or whether the accusatory instrument has been
dismissed on grounds of innocence. In Alabama, an individual is
eligible for compensation if the conviction is vacated or reversed
and the accusatory instrument is dismissed on grounds of inno
cence, or the accusatory instrument is dismissed on grounds consis
tent with innocence.108
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
The proposed statute, as described earlier, permits innocence
to be demonstrated pursuant to either an executive pardon or a ju
dicial determination.109 As to pardons, the statute follows the maId. at 599 & n.7. See also Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d at 433-36 (claimant “failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence” that he did he not commit vehicular manslaughter,
which requires as an element that the driver be intoxicated; expert testimony at trial
established that the claimant’s blood alcohol fell within .081 and .096 at the time of the
accident and that once .08 is reached, “most drivers’ driving skills are measurably im
paired.”); Ambler v. Rice, No. 95-2328, 1996 WL 543880, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sep. 26,
1996) (burden not satisfied in light of the “evidence of opportunity and motive, includ
ing numerous death threats made against the victim, the concoction of an alibi, and
incriminating statements [the defendant] made in front of correctional officers after he
was acquitted.”).
By contrast, in one New York case, the claimant managed to demonstrate clear and
convincing evidence:
innocence of a murder simply by testifying that he had been in another state at
the time of the crime and by discrediting the credibility of the prosecution’s
alleged eyewitness—whose testimony was the only evidence linking him to the
crime—with information about her character that had not been available to
the defense at the first trial. Ordinary testimony was sufficient to meet the
burden.
Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 108 (footnote omitted) (citing Cleveland v. New York, Ct.
Cl. No. 74204 (Apr. 22, 1992)). See generally Stanley Z. Fisher, Convictions of Innocent
Persons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2002) (providing ex
amples of cases, old and new, where factual innocence was established or was inferable
from the circumstances).
106. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:572.8(A)(2), (B) (Supp. 2011).
107. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D §§ 1(B)(ii), (C) (2008).
108. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-157 (LexisNexis 2003).
109. See supra Part II.B.4.
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jority of “pardon” jurisdictions in requiring a specific finding by the
executive that the claimant was actually innocent of the crime
charged, including innocence of any lesser included offenses arising
out of the same facts and circumstances, without specifying the bur
den of proof. A more stringent standard would infringe on tradi
tional executive prerogatives. Additionally, a pardon might often
take into account all of the facts surrounding a case.110
In a majority of “judicial determination” jurisdictions, the bur
den of proof is clear and convincing evidence of innocence of the
crime, including innocence of any lesser-included offenses arising
out of the same facts and circumstances. As illustrated by the case
law on the subject, this standard will filter out frivolous or other
wise meritless claims.111 Significantly, a judicial reversal is not nec
essarily the same as a finding of factual innocence: a defendant can
more readily show that procedural or constitutional violations tar
nished his or her trial or that the guilt was not free from all doubt
than an exoneree can show that he or she is innocent by clear and
convincing evidence, so as to gain monetary compensation.112 In
simpler terms, compensation is not for individuals who are unable
to prove their innocence in fact.113 Still, the burden of proving in
110. Still, there may be some concern that executives will be less willing to grant
pardons, or at least pardons based on determinations of innocence, if those pardoned
are explicitly given a cause of action against the state.
111. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 574 N.E.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. 1991) (finding that a re
versal of the underlying criminal conviction is not equivalent to a finding of innocence
in a subsequent civil proceeding for wrongful imprisonment involving a lower standard
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Vasquez v. State, 693 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that a reversal of the underlying criminal conviction does not
establish innocence by clear and convincing evidence); Walden v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962,
966 (Ohio 1989) (stating that “[a]s a general rule, a verdict or judgment of acquittal in a
criminal trial is . . . not necessarily a finding that the accused is innocent” for purposes
of a wrongful imprisonment claim); Le Fevre v. Goodland, 19 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Wis.
1945) (finding that a determination that the state’s evidence was insufficient to prove
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is not equal to finding the defendant is
innocent beyond a reasonable doubt); see also ABA Report, supra note 35, at 6-7 (ex
plaining that in those “rare situations where statutory bars prohibit evidence, . . . ethical
obligation[s] of defense counsel . . . . will . . . prevent a bogus claim of actual
innocence”).
112. See, e.g, Ambler v. Rice, No. 95-2328, 1996 WL 543880, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
Sep. 26, 1996) (appellate court had ordered a new trial because the trial judge had
“refused to allow Ambler’s attorney to impeach the credibility of the prosecution’s pri
mary witness”; defendant acquitted upon retrial but denied compensation due to failure
to satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard).
113. See Geoffrey Fattah, Financial Compensation Bill Passes House Committee,
DESERET MORNING NEWS (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/6952489
90/Financial-compensation-bill-passes-House-committee.html (discussing a state sena
tor’s comments about a proposed senate bill to provide compensation to wrongfully
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nocence does not require proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” let
alone metaphysical certainty.114 It is not so severe as to hamper
truly meritorious claims.
C. Procedures for Bringing a Compensation Claim
In addition to requirements relating to the imprisonment, con
duct, and exoneration of the wrongfully convicted individual, cer
tain procedural formalities must be followed in order to receive
compensation. Generally, the action must be brought in a statuto
rily determined forum, against a predetermined state defendant
(which may be the “state” itself), and within a prescribed period of
time. The proposed statute provides a specific statute of limita
tions, but channels suits into the judicial or administrative forum
where actions against the state ordinarily arise.
1. Proper Forum
a. Statutory survey
All of the compensation statutes recognize that compensation
for wrongful imprisonment is a liability of the state, rather than any
individual public official.115 Two other statutes explicitly waive the
state’s sovereign immunity or declare the state’s consent to be sued.
Maine provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any immunity of the State
from suit, including the Maine Tort Claims Act, . . . the State is
liable for the wrongful imprisonment of a person.”116 Ohio, mean
while, consents to be sued by a wrongfully imprisoned individual
and to liability on its part to the extent provided in its compensation
statute.117 Texas formerly had a similar provision but repealed it
convicted persons in Utah). Under the proposed statue, individuals whose convictions
are overturned on procedural grounds are not automatically precluded from receiving
compensation. See infra Part II.E. Rather, such persons are afforded an opportunity to
demonstrate actual innocence before the appropriate judicial forum. See infra Part
II.E. For instance, at least one New York court has held the state to be liable for an
unjust conviction based solely on the testimony of eyewitness who later recanted. See
Noeleen G. Walder, State Held Liable for Unjust Murder Conviction Where Only Wit
ness Admitted Testifying Falsely, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 2009, at 1, 7.
114. See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 108 (noting that it “might be expected that
only DNA exclusion cases could meet the clear and convincing standard, and that such
a high standard would needlessly thwart meritorious claims,” but that has not been the
case).
115. But in some cases an individual public official may be sued for violation of
federal civil rights or in tort, depending on the laws of the jurisdiction.
116. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(1) (2003).
117. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(F)(3) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
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when it changed its statute to provide only an administrative
remedy.118
The remaining jurisdictions simply acknowledge that a wrong
fully convicted person has a cause of action either in the courts or
before a claims board. Under the Wisconsin statute, for instance,
wrongfully convicted and imprisoned persons “may petition the
claims board for compensation for such imprisonment.”119 In addi
tion to Wisconsin, seven other states provide compensation by
claims boards:120 Alabama (Division of Risk Management verifies
eligibility to Committee on Compensation for Wrongful Convic
tion);121 California (Victim Compensation and Government Claims
Board recommends appropriation by legislature);122 Maryland
(Board of Public Works makes award);123 New Hampshire (board
of claims);124 North Carolina (Industrial Commissioner makes
award);125 Oklahoma (Risk Management Administrator of the De
partment of Central Services);126 and Tennessee (Board of
Claims).127
The Virginia statute also provides for administrative-like mech
anisms. In Virginia, claims are to be paid by the Comptroller, sub
ject to approval by the General Assembly.128 Other jurisdictions
require an action to be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction
or a court of claims. These include Illinois,129 Ohio,130 New
York,131 West Virginia,132 and the federal government.133
Other jurisdictions expressly limit or direct the mechanisms of
judicial relief. Louisiana provides that all claims must be filed in
one district court,134 while Maine and Massachusetts provide that
118. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.101(a) (West 2011) repealed by
2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 180 § 12(2) (West).
119. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(2) (West 2009).
120. See id.
121. ALA. CODE § 29-2-158 (LexisNexis 2003).
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2011).
123. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
124. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:13 (2007).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84 (2009).
126. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 156 (West 2008).
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108 (Supp. 2011).
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011).
129. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).
130. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(B) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
131. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011).
132. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2006).
134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(C)(1) (Supp. 2011), amended by 2011 La.
Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West).
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the superior court shall have original jurisdiction over claims for
wrongful imprisonment.135 New Jersey states that suits for damages
for wrongful conviction may be brought in the superior court
against the Department of the Treasury.136 Iowa permits tort claims
to be filed in a district court subject to prior negotiation by a state
appeal board.137
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
Given the variety of judicial and administrative mechanisms
for receiving compensation among the various jurisdictions, the
proposed statute, rather than electing any specific mechanism, pro
vides that compensation claims shall be brought in the appropriate
forum for claims against the state as determined by state law.138
The statute includes sections for both judicial and administrative
relief, allowing each jurisdiction to choose the appropriate forum.
This approach not only avoids general confusion regarding the ap
plication of the statute, but also respects traditional state judicialgovernance prerogatives. It is also consistent with the procedural
reality that the compensation action is against the state. Further,
federal courts have tended to honor state-prescribed compensation
procedures and have not hesitated to dismiss improperly filed
suits.139
2. Statute of Limitations
a. Statutory survey
Many compensation statutes provide a statute of limitations for
bringing compensation actions. This period generally begins to run
when the wrongfully imprisoned convicted person is exonerated or
135. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8243 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, § 3
(2010).
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-2 (West 2009); see also Dorsett v. N.J. State Police,
04 CV 5652, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10512, at *17 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2007) (dismissing
claim “for failure to file in the proper forum and failure to name the Department of
Treasury as a defendant”); Wilson v. N.J. State Police, 04 CV 1523 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60514, at *31-32, 35 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2006) (refusing to extend supplemental
pendent jurisdiction over an improperly filed claim, despite appeals “[i]n the interests
of judicial efficiency,” where “the State ha[d] not waived its sovereign immunity to be
sued under this statute in federal court”).
137. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 663A.1(5), 669.3, 669.4, 669.5 (West 1998).
138. Bernhard suggests that “[e]xisting forums” can handle compensation claims
“expeditiously” given the relatively small number of cases that will arise in any year.
See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 109. “Furthermore the legal issues arising are neither
so technical nor so unique as to justify creation of a specialized agency.” Id.
139. See supra note 136.

2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 27

released from prison. Two years is the most common limitation,
having been adopted by ten states: Alabama,140 Illinois,141 Iowa,142
Louisiana,143 Maine,144 Massachusetts,145 Ohio,146 New Jersey,147
New York,148 and West Virginia.149
A claim must be filed within five years in North Carolina;150
three years in New Hampshire151 and Texas;152 one year in Tennes
see;153 and two years in California.154 Montana accepts applications
for educational assistance within ten years following exoneration,
but limits aid to five years within this ten-year period.155 No time
limitation is expressed in the compensation statutes of five jurisdic
tions: Maryland, Oklahoma, Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia.
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
In accord with the approach taken by the Innocence Project in
its proposed statute, the statute proposed herein adopts a threeyear statute of limitations. 156 The statute of limitations begins to
run when the claimant is found actually innocent of the crime of
wrongful conviction and imprisonment, whether by executive par
don157 or judicial determination.158 This means that the limitations
period contained in the proposed statute applies only with respect
to the damages phase of a compensation claim. Thus, if a convic
tion were reversed on procedural rather than factual grounds,159 the
140. ALA. CODE § 29-2-162 (LexisNexis 2003).
141. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/22(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).
142. IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(8) (West 1998).
143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(D) (Supp. 2011).
144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8244 (2003).
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 8 (2010).
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(H) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-4 (West 2009).
148. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(7) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011).
149. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(h) (LexisNexis 2009).
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2009).
151. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(IV) (2007).
152. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.003 (West 2011).
153. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(F) (Supp. 2011).
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4901 (West 2011).
155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214(4) (2009).
156. See Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, § 6. Additionally, the
proposed statute provides that, “[p]ersons convicted, incarcerated and released from
custody prior to the effective date of this Act shall commence an action under this Act
within three years of said effective date.” Id.
157. See supra Part II.B.5.b.
158. See supra Part II.B.5.b.
159. See infra Part II.E.
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statute of limitations would not yet become applicable. It would
begin to run when the person is declared factually innocent in a
later judicial proceeding.
Questions regarding time constraints in seeking or applying for
executive or judicial determinations of actual innocence are beyond
the scope of the proposed statute. Over two-fifths of compensation
jurisdictions, as well as other proposed statutes, have determined
that a two-year timeframe is sufficient for one to present a claim of
wrongful conviction and imprisonment.160 A period greater than
two years is preferable due to practical and equitable considera
tions. Reintegration into society often delays and disrupts the pro
cess of retaining counsel and formulating a legal claim. One
concern is that upon release from prison most exonerees are preoc
cupied with reorienting their lives.161 Before starting to navigate
the relatively complex compensation process, a claimant should be
given adequate time to readjust to life outside of prison. Addition
ally, finding suitable legal counsel could take considerable time.
These concerns may have been recognized by the Innocence Project
and those jurisdictions with limitation periods of longer than two
years.162
There may be some merit in adopting a substantially longer
statute of limitations. But evidentiary and administration consider
ations militate against that approach. The compensation schemes
of New York, New Jersey, and West Virginia, although employing
the two year alternative, support this assertion. These statutes pro
vide, in their preliminary findings, that when determining actual in
nocence, “due consideration” is to be given “to difficulties of
proof” beyond the control of the claimant, including the “passage
of time” and “death or unavailability of witnesses.”163 Read to
gether, the statute of limitations and preliminary findings represent
a legislative determination that although traditional evidentiary re
quirements should be relaxed, problems of proof would become too
difficult to overcome if compensation actions could be initiated in
definitely after exoneration. A statute of limitations of three years
160. ABA Report, supra note 35, at 2 (stating that the two-year timeframe ap
plies if a notice requirement is not fulfilled); Arizona State Law Journal: Model Act,
supra note 35, at 712; see also Bernhard I, supra note 35 (describing two years as
“reasonable”).
161. See infra note 203.
162. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C (West 2009).
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will help avoid evidentiary problems while preserving judicial and
administrative resources.
States should also consider extending the limitations period in
at least some cases to avoid unfairness. These include cases in
which the claimant is delayed in bringing the claim because of
health problems, a mental disability, an extreme hardship, or other
justifiable reasons. Courts and agencies may also apply traditional
equitable exceptions when it is practically impossible for the claim
ant to meet the statute of limitations. But an explicit exception for
special circumstances will better ensure that wrongfully convicted
and imprisoned persons are not deprived of a realistic opportunity
to obtain reasonable compensation.
D. Calculation of the Award
In many jurisdictions monetary losses relating to wrongful im
prisonment, as well as less tangible factors, may be considered in
determining the appropriate award. The proposed statute follows
the latter approach, allowing consideration of a range of factors, but
leaving it up to the enacting jurisdiction to determine the eviden
tiary burden in establishing damages.
1. Prescribed Criteria and Discretionary Considerations
a. Statutory survey
In those states that offer compensation to wrongfully impris
oned persons, there is great variation with respect to how to deter
mine the amount of the award. Most compensation schemes fall
into one or more of the following categories. They (1) prescribe or
limit the amount awardable for each year of incarceration or specify
precisely which losses are recoverable; (2) limit the total possible
award; (3) provide a list of factors that may be considered, such as
lost income; (4) offer great deference to courts or claim boards in
determining the appropriate amount; or (5) authorize payment for
medical, educational, or other services. Others merely affirm the
availability of an action for damages.
A few statutes do not place caps on the total amount recover
able, but instead limit the amount awardable for each year or day of
incarceration, or in some other fashion. Alabama’s statute allots
$50,000 for each year of incarceration and additional compensation
at the discretion of the Committee on Compensation for Wrongful
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Incarceration.164 In California, the claimant must establish “pecu
niary injury” before the board, which then recommends that the
legislature appropriate a sum of $100 per day of incarceration
served subsequent to the claimant’s conviction.165 New Jersey pro
vides that damages for mistaken imprisonment “shall not exceed
twice the amount of the claimant’s income in the year prior to his
incarceration or $20,000.00 for each year of incarceration, which
ever is greater” and “reasonable attorney fees.”166 Under federal
law, the United States Court of Federal Claims may award damages
up to $100,000 per year for any plaintiff sentenced to death, and
$50,000 per year for any other plaintiff.167
For statutes that link compensation to the duration of wrongful
imprisonment, the award is more commonly subject to a maximum
total recovery. North Carolina enables the Industrial Commis
sioner to award a claimant $50,000 for each year of imprisonment,
up to a maximum of $750,000.168 Texas entitles the claimant to
$80,000 multiplied by the number of years of incarceration, if the
time served is less than 20 years, or $500,000 if the time served is
twenty years or more.169 Illinois has the following maximums:
$85,350 for up to five years of imprisonment, $170,000 for five to
fourteen years of imprisonment, and $199,150 for more than four
164. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159 (LexisNexis 2003); see also Bernhard II, supra note
35, at 705 (referring to this statute as one of the few “generous compensation systems”).
As with this statute, the other statutes that link compensation to the length of incarcera
tion do so on a pro rata basis. For brevity purposes, this fact will be omitted hereafter
when describing these statutes.
165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2011).
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5 (West 2009).
167. 28 U.S.C. 2513(e) (2006); John G. Browning, Legally Speaking: Compensat
ing the Exonerated, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC. (Nov. 28, 2007, 9:30 AM), http://www.
setexasrecord.com/arguments/204519-legally-speaking-compensating-the-exonerated
(noting the “surprising[ ]” generosity of Uncle Sam when it comes to compensation).
168. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84 (2009).
169. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052 (West 2011). A prior
version of the Texas statute that awarded only $25,000 per year came “under fire” for
the “[relatively low] amount it provide[d].” Browning, supra note 167. An attorney for
the West Texas Innocence Project pointed out that the available compensation at that
time was “a joke. I don’t know of anybody who says ‘I’ll go to prison for 20 years of my
life if you’ll give $25,000 [a year] at the end of it.’” Id. (alteration in original); see also
David Ellison, Ex-con Fights for Bill to Help the Wrongly Convicted, HOUS. CHRON.,
Sep. 6, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Ex
con-fights-for-bill-to-help-the-wrongly-1861447.php (Following a ten-year prison stay
for a wrongful rape conviction, Anthony Robinson earned a law degree from a law
school in Texas. He is described by a state senator as the “poster child for why we need
to have Texas mirror the federal standard.”).
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teen years of imprisonment.170 Louisiana limits recovery to $25,000
per year of incarceration, not to exceed $250,000; the district court,
if it is “reasonable and appropriate,” may also “order payment” for
job-skills training, medical and counseling services, and tuition and
fees at community colleges and units of the state university.171 Wis
consin provides that “the claims board shall find the amount which
will equitably compensate [a claimant], not to exceed $25,000 and at
a rate . . . not greater than $5,000 per year.”172
Three statutes do not base compensation directly on the length
of incarceration, but still limit total possible recovery. Oklahoma
limits total recovery to $175,000.173 Maine imposes a limit of
$300,000 for all claims, including court costs and interest.174 In New
Hampshire, the claimant may receive up to $20,000 and, at the dis
cretion of the board of claims, may also receive attorneys’ fees.175
Other states employ more complicated calculation schemes.
The Iowa statute provides that damages recoverable by a wrong
fully imprisoned person are limited to restitution for fines,
surcharges, penalties, court costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees for
criminal proceedings, appeals, and costs of any civil actions or postconviction proceedings, and actions for compensation.176 Liqui
dated damages are limited to $50 per day of wrongful imprisonment
and lost wages or earned income up to $25,000 per year.177
In Ohio, a wrongfully imprisoned individual may recover fines,
court costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees related to all criminal
170. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West Supp. 2011). Under this statute,
attorneys’ fees may not exceed 25% of the award granted, and costs of living adjust
ments may not exceed 5%. See id.
171. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2) (Supp. 2011), amended by 2011 La.
Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West); see also In re Williams, No. 538401, 2007
WL 4792141 (La. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2007), judgment vacated by In re Williams, 984 So.2d
789 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (awarding statutory maximum plus “One Thousand dollars . . .
for payment of tuition, books and other materials necessary for job skill training at the
Louisiana Technical College, . . . as well as . . . Five Thousand dollars . . . for medical
and counseling services . . . calculated at the rate of . . . $90 for each . . . weekly visit up
to a maximum of 3 years”).
172. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009). Compensation shall include “at
torney fees, costs and disbursements.” Id. If the claims board finds that a larger
amount is necessary it must submit a report specifying the amount to each house of the
legislature. Id.
173. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(4) (West 2008).
174. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242 (2003).
175. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 541-B:14, -B:18 (2007).
176. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 663A.1(6)(a)-(d) (West 1998).
177. Id.
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proceedings, appeals, and the action to be released from prison.178
Damages are limited to $43,300 for each year of incarceration, sub
ject to adjustment by the state auditor and any loss of wages or
income that directly resulted from wrongful arrest, prosecution,
conviction and imprisonment.179 The statute also permits the state
to seek reimbursement for costs from the individual for services at
the detention facility, including sick calls and fees related to hous
ing, feeding, and supervision.180
Massachusetts permits recovery up to $500,000 for lost income,
the length and conditions of incarceration, and any other injuries.181
The court may also direct the Commonwealth to provide services to
address any deficiencies in the claimant’s physical and emotional
condition caused by the wrongful imprisonment and to permit the
claimant to receive educational services from any state or commu
nity college at 50% of the cost.182
Virginia authorizes the Comptroller, with the approval of the
General Assembly, to award compensation equal to ninety percent
of the Commonwealth’s per capita income, for each year of incar
ceration up to twenty years.183 The award may be divided into an
initial payment of 20 percent, and an annuity for the remaining 80
percent.184 The claimant is also eligible to receive a tuition assis
tance grant of $15,000, which is deducted from the total award, and
reimbursement up to $10,000 for tuition, career, and technical train
ing in a Virginia community college contingent upon successful
completion of the training.185 Montana offers only educational aid,
and only to the wrongfully convicted who were exonerated based
on the results of post-conviction forensic DNA testing.186 This aid
may cover tuition and related expenses for any community college,

178. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.48(E)(2)(a)-(d) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5 (2008).
182. Id.
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11 (2007 & Supp. 2011).
184. Id. Bernhard refers to this as an example of a “cynical, protective statute[ ]”
that does “not reflect public opinion as expressed by the media, and [is] inconsistent
with other progressive reform efforts motivated by exonerations across the country.”
See Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 706.
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11.
186. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2009).
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state college, or tribally controlled community college for any
person.187
Some state statutes afford substantial deference to courts or
claims boards in assessing the amount of compensation. The New
York and West Virginia statutes, for example, provide that if a
claimant is entitled to judgment, damages shall be awarded in an
amount that the court determines will fairly and reasonably com
pensate him.188 Judicial deference is also important in the District
of Columbia Code, which states without further qualification that
the judge may award damages upon a finding of unjust imprison
187. Id. Compensation under this statute does not extend beyond this type of
assistance. See Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 706 (referring to the benefits under this
statute as “symbolic token support”).
188. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g) (LexisNexis 2009); see also Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 710
(promoting compensation statutes for their facility in resolving disputes, citing New
York’s as a prime example). Bernhard recounts the compensation suit of Larry David
Holdren, who was wrongfully imprisoned in West Virginia for fourteen years:
Simply by reading Holdren’s uncontested petition, the West Virginia Court of
Claims concluded the state was liable for the wrongful conviction. Turning to
damages, the court pointed out that Mr. Holdren had spent fifteen years in
prison and had been enrolled in an undergraduate university program at the
time of his arrest. The court heard an economist estimate what Mr. Holdren
might have been expected to earn during the fifteen years if his career plans
had progressed uninterrupted. The court considered the claimant’s “impair
ment of future earnings . . . , as well as the loss of reputation, the loss of
liberty, emotional stress, pain and suffering, and the reputation of the particu
lar facility in which the claimant was imprisoned in determining the amount of
the award.” Finally, the court recognized that the claimant had already par
tially recovered through a civil action against a third party and took that into
consideration in estimating damages. In a two-and-one-half-page decision, the
court determined that the claimant was entitled to an award of $ 1,650,000,
approximately $110,000 for each year spent in prison.
Although some might complain that the award was too low, the claimant
recovered relatively quickly and without having to finance complicated litiga
tion. He was not required to obtain a pardon, which might have been impossi
ble. Finally, the damages, while not copious, were sufficient to permit Mr.
Holdren to complete school, purchase a home, or invest in a business should
he so desire—activities he certainly would have enjoyed had he not been
falsely accused and imprisoned. The award could finance the psychological
therapy so many of the exonerated need. The award provided a foundation
upon which to begin to build a life.
Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 709-10 (alteration original) (citations omitted) (citing
Holdren v. State, No. CC-00-461 (W. Va. Ct. Cl. Apr. 2, 2002)).
Another statute worth noting here is that of Wisconsin. The statute describes the
standard for determining compensation as “equitabl[e],” but such characterization is
questionable given the stringent limits on recovery and difficulty of transcending those
limits. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009); see supra note 172 and accompanying
text.
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ment.189 The board of claims in Tennessee also has considerable
leeway in determining compensation: it may consider all relevant
factors, including, but not limited to, the person’s physical and
mental suffering and loss of earnings, but may not grant an award in
excess of $1,000,000.190 The Maryland statute, which calls for an
amount commensurate with the actual damages sustained by the
claimant, and a reasonable amount for any financial or other appro
priate counseling for the individual due to the confinement, pro
vides more guided deference, though no cap on recovery.191
Texas is the only state which provides the exoneree with
monthly annuity payments for the duration of the exoneree’s life.192
These payments are based on a present value sum equal to the total
amount of the award and “on a five percent per annum interest rate
and other actuarial factors within the discretion of the comptrol
ler.”193 The applicant is not permitted to “sell, mortgage or other
wise encumber, or anticipate the payments, wholly or partly, by
assignment or otherwise.”194
Some statutes introduce other conditions regarding recovery.
Four jurisdictions expressly prohibit the awarding of punitive dam
ages: Maine,195 Massachusetts,196 Oklahoma,197 and the District of
Columbia.198
Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, and Ohio do not allow compensa
tion awards to be reduced by expenses incurred by the state relating
to the arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of the individual (in
189. D.C. CODE § 2-423 (LexisNexis 2008).
190. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (Supp. 2011). This statute was enacted in
response to the case of Clark McMillan, who was exonerated by DNA evidence after
“serv[ing] twenty-two and a half years for a crime that he did not commit” and who,
as a result of his wrongful conviction, . . . sustained the following injuries: pain
and suffering; severe mental anguish; emotional distress; loss of income; inflic
tion of physical illness; inadequate medical care; humiliation, indignities, and
embarrassment; degradation; injury to reputation; permanent loss of natural
psychological development; and McMillan also endured restrictions on his lib
erty and all forms of personal freedom, such as diet, sleep, personal contact,
educational opportunity, vocational opportunity, athletic opportunity, per
sonal fulfillment, sexual activity, family relations, reading, television, movies,
travel, enjoyment, and expression.
2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 880 at 2.
191. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
192. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.053(a) (West 2011).
193. Id. § 103.053(b).
194. Id. § 103.053(c).
195. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242 (2003).
196. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(A) (2008).
197. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(C) (West 2008).
198. D.C. CODE § 2-423 (LexisNexis 2008).
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cluding the costs of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care).199
The Massachusetts statute contains a similar provision. It further
directs that the award not be offset by the value in reduction in
tuition and fees for educational services or the value of services
provided to the claimant as part of the award.200
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
The proposed statute provides for fair and just compensation
of the wrongfully imprisoned individual and payment for reasona
ble and necessary services. In awarding compensation, the review
ing court or agency is to consider the following non-exhaustive list
of factors to the extent it considers relevant: (1) costs incurred, in
cluding attorneys’ fees (where the attorney has not been paid to
represent the exoneree, such as a legal aid or public defender attor
ney compensated by the state), in connection with criminal and civil
proceedings relating to the wrongful conviction and imprisonment,
including the action to obtain compensation;201 (2) the conditions of
incarceration, including, but not limited to, any physical and mental
suffering caused by imprisonment; (3) loss of wages or salary that
directly resulted from the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
wrongful imprisonment;202 and (4) fees expended by the claimant
for medical care, housing, supervision, and other services rendered
while imprisoned.
Additionally, the state may be ordered to provide medical and
mental health services for conditions related to the wrongful impris
onment; without showing this link, the claimant may request free
counseling from the state department of mental health or its
equivalent.203 The claimant is entitled to receive educational assis
199. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-160 (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(7)
(West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(c)(3) (Supp. 2011), amended by 2011
La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(F)(1)
(West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
200. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D § 5(B) (2008).
201. See Arizona State Law Journal: Model Act, supra note 35, at 711 (providing
for “reasonable attorney’s fees” as part of “compensatory damages”).
202. Although no compensation statute has an offset for windfall profits to a ce
lebrity inmate, and neither does the proposed statute, an enacting state may want to
consider including one. Such a provision would call for the reduction of any award by
the amount the claimant has profited from wrongful conviction and which the inmate
would not have earned in the event of an (earlier) acquittal or dismissal. Yet this type
of situation is a rarity, and one that could be dealt with adequately under the “fair” and
“reasonable” standard of the proposed statute, as currently written.
203. See Santos & Roberts, supra note 79 (discussing the necessity of providing
medical and social services to exonerees). “One of the biggest challenges is that once
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tance, including payment for tuition and related expenses at a state
or community college, and may elect to receive one year of jobskills training at the state’s expense.204 Finally, the compensation
award may not be offset by any expenses assumed by the state in
connection with the arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of the
exoneree.205
The statute does not place limits on compensation, and this
may raise an objection to enactment.206 However, punitive or ex
emplary damages are not recoverable. The “lost opportunity costs”
of wrongful imprisonment are tremendous and may well amount to
the destruction of a person’s livelihood, physical and emotional
well-being, and personal relationships.207 Putting an artificial cap
an innocent person comes out of prison, they are not equipped with the tools to reinte
grate into society, and that’s something that money alone can’t solve,” a New Jersey
state representative explained. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This represen
tative “introduced a bill to set aside $1.25 million a year for programs for exonerated
prisoners.” Id. Meanwhile, “[i]n New York, a bill has been drafted that would allow
the wrongly convicted to receive services from agencies that already serve other needy
populations, such as families on welfare.” Id.; see also Shawn Armbrust, When Money
Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 157, 181 (2004) (“Because the problems exonerated individuals face
upon release are not easily calculable, it is important to provide resources for job train
ing and health care to ensure that the wrongfully convicted are fully compensated for
the problems their loss of liberty has created.”).
204. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
205. See ABA Report, supra note 35, at 9 (advocating for a similar provision).
206. Cf. Santos & Roberts, supra note 79 (stating that, in response to a proposed
compensation bill in Pennsylvania, a state representative asked, “Once you open up
those floodgates, where do you get all the money to pay for these falsely charged peo
ple? . . . How much money is it going to require? How much is a person worth?”).
207. See Browning, supra note 167 (illustrating the inadequacies of the Texas
compensation statute by citing the case of Greg Wallis, who could only recover $25,000
for each of the fifteen years he served for a wrongful rape conviction). According to
Browning,
Besides the emotional and psychological toll taken by years behind bars, indi
viduals like Greg Wallis [who was exonerated by DNA evidence in 2006 after
serving over fifteen years for a wrongful conviction of rape] have to cope with
the economic realities of a career interrupted and a return to the
workforce. . . .
Think about it. You’ve been convicted for a crime you know you didn’t
commit. You’ve been plucked from family and friends and thrown into a
human cesspool for years as you struggle to survive the grim realities of prison
life-gang violence, murder, rape and degradation.
Then, if you’ve been among the fortunate few to have been vindicated by
genetic testing, you’re released into a world that in many ways you don’t rec
ognize. As you struggle to adjust and get your life back, how much do you
think each year that’s been stolen from you is worth?
Something tells me that for most of us, that figure would be higher than
$25,000.
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on compensation could lead to something less than a truly compre
hensive remedy.208 Of course, a wrongfully imprisoned person will
never truly be made fully whole.209 The individual can only be
fairly and reasonably compensated in light of potentially quantifi
able factors.210
The term “reasonable,” in particular, connotes that the judge
or agency must proceed with an eye towards the preservation of
Id.
208. See id.; Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 105-07 (discussing how “unreasonable
limitations [on awards have] discourage[d] claim filings” in several states and also have
discouraged lawyers from taking up these cases); see also ABA Report, supra note 35,
at 7 (suggesting that if any cap is enacted, it should correspond with “other existing caps
in the jurisdiction, such as those for medical malpractice or other tort claims”); Arizona
State Law Journal: Model Act, supra note 35, at 711 (“The court shall compensate the
claimant for proven losses without limitation as to amount,” but “may not award exem
plary damages.”).
209. In some sense, “the wrongly convicted may actually suffer a loss greater than
death.” Santos & Roberts, supra note 79 (paraphrasing “Stan V. Smith, a forensic
economist and expert on compensation for loss of life”); see also Ellison, supra note 169
(quoting Anthony Robinson, exoneree, explaining how “it’s just sad that people don’t
realize that even if you gave them a million dollars a year, the injury goes beyond what
the compensation can possibly give to make up for it”). Despite physical freedom, an
exonerated person may experience daily the “nightmare” of the wrongful imprison
ment. Santos & Roberts, supra note 79 (quoting Darryl Hunt who was exonerated in
North Carolina after serving 18 years for murder). That an exonerated person will for
ever “battl[e] deep emotional scars,” id., regardless of compensation, does not mean
that such a person should be denied a comprehensive remedy in terms of both a finan
cial award and the provision of health and other services. As the New York Court of
Claims put it:
The claimant has been humiliated, degraded, shamed and suffered a loss of
reputation and earnings. For this he must be paid, and for this money dam
ages can be compensatory. But all the wealth of the State of New York could
not compensate the claimant for the mental anguish suffered through nearly
twelve years of false imprisonment, under the impression that he would be
there for the rest of his life. How can a man be repaid who has been branded
a murderer and whose only hope is an early death to release him from the
sentence erroneously passed on him? For this, any award is bound to be a
mere token, but it should compensate as well as the medium allows.
Hoffner v. State, 142 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631-32 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1955) (awarding over one hun
dred thousand dollars); see also Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 107 (discussing McLaugh
lin v. State, No. 75123 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Oct. 16, 1989), where the court awarded $1.5 million
for various non-pecuniary injuries, including “loss of liberty [for over six years of
wrongful imprisonment], mental stress anguish and reputation”).
210. Dedication of resources to reentry and discharge planning is an important,
and an increasingly necessary element of rehabilitating all former inmates, exonerated
or otherwise. The need to curb future criminal activity should be treated as a para
mount goal. Recognizing that the innocent inmate, while innocent, has nonetheless
been exposed to a prison environment, the proposed statute contemplates that exoner
ated inmates will be afforded the full benefits of reentry planning (such as career train
ing) that a jurisdiction has to offer.
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public resources.211 However, it is worth noting that even in states
that do provide statutory access to compensation for wrongful im
prisonment, the number and quantity of awards has been minimal.
In New York, of the more than 200 wrongful conviction claims
heard by the New York Court of Claims in the past two decades,
there were over 150 dismissals, 19 out-of-court settlements, and
only 12 actual awards. The twelve exonerees received an average
of just $457,000 per case.212 Similarly, in Wisconsin there have been
only two successful claims in the last 55 years, while only one claim
has been paid as the result of Texas’s compensation statute.213 The
value, in terms of preserving limited state resources, of placing an
artificial cap on awards for wrongful imprisonments is therefore
questionable.214 Further, states save substantial resources by re
leasing wrongfully convicted individuals, as imprisonment costs at
least $20,000 per year for each inmate, and escalating.215 On bal
ance, the state will not be unduly burdened if no cap on compensa
tion is incorporated.
211. This point is illustrated by New York’s compensation statute, which, like the
proposed statute, does not limit damages. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989
& Supp. 2011). The New York statute appears to grant judges even greater deference
in determining the award. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. Still, in New
York, a state with one of the highest levels of exonerations, “the cost of compensating
deserving individuals has been minimal.” Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 715.
212. Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 715-16.
213. Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 106-07.
214. See id. at 106 (noting that “[t]he number of wrongful convictions occurring in
any state is simply not great enough to” justify severe restrictions on the amount
recoverable).
215. As explained in the Chicago Sun Times,
Considering the costs borne by taxpayers for criminal court buildings,
court clerk staff, judges, prosecutors, police officers and prisons, larger pay
ments to the wrongfully convicted would represent a mere drop in the bucket.
Such statutory compensation should be swift and meaningful. The U.S.
government pays up to $50,000 per year for persons wrongfully convicted of
non-capital federal crimes (and more for those who landed on Death Row).
Ohio awards $40,300 per year plus lost income. California provides $100 per
day, or $35,200 per year.
Sound like a lot? Consider this: The cost of housing a prison inmate is
about $20,000 per year. Assuming Michael would have lived another 30 years
or so in prison, the State of Illinois actually saved $600,000 by his release.
Karen Daniel, Editorial, Wrongfully Convicted People Get Pittance for Years in Prison,
CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at 41; see also CHRISTOPHER REINHART, COST OF IN
CARCERATION AND COST OF A CAREER CRIMINAL, Conn. Office of Legislative Re
search, Doc. No. 2008-R-0099 (2008), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008
R-0099.htm (stating that “the annual cost to incarcerate an inmate in . . . Connecticut in
FY 06” was $44,165).
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Under the proposed statute, the awarding authority in its dis
cretion may direct payment of compensation in lump sum, install
ments, or following Texas’s lead, in annuity payments216 as it deems
appropriate. Upon release from prison, many exonerees lack the
experience to manage personal finances. The annuity payments are
a way to guarantee that exonerees will receive some support for the
rest of their lives.217 The payments will be based on a present value
sum equal to the total amount of the award and on market interest
rate per annum and other actuarial factors within the discretion of
the jurisdiction’s awarding entity. The annuity payments may not
be accelerated, deferred, increased, or decreased. The applicant
may not sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber, or anticipate the
payments, wholly or partly, by assignment or otherwise. In deter
mining whether to commute the compensation to a lump sum pay
ment, the awarding authority must consider whether there exists
special needs warranting such payment, whether it will be in the
best interests of the individual and whether that individual has the
ability to wisely manage and control the commuted award irrespec
tive of whether there exist special needs.218
2. The Burden of Proof in Demonstrating Damages
a. Statutory survey
A majority of the jurisdictions that recognize judicial exonera
tions require “clear and convincing” evidence of innocence. The
burden of proof is less clear for establishing the appropriate amount
of compensation in jurisdictions that do not limit an individual to a
fixed amount per year of incarceration. Although it is difficult to
categorize the relevant statutes, two general trends are observable:
(1) conventional evidentiary requirements are relaxed; and (2) stan
dards of fairness and reasonableness in determining appropriate
damages are employed. But these formulations provide little direct
guidance about the rigor or thoroughness with which damages must
be established.219 In the absence of an express burden of proof, the
216. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.053 (West 2011).
217. Jeff Carlton, Texas DNA Exonerees Find Prosperity After Prison, ASSOC.
PRESS, Sept. 4, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8691540
(“The monthly payments are expected to be a lifeline for exonerees such as Wiley
Fountain, 53, who received nearly $390,000 in compensation . . . but squandered it by, as
he said, ‘living large.’ He ended up homeless, spending his nights in a tattered sleeping
bag behind a liquor store.”).
218. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(D) (Supp. 2011).
219. One statute expressly includes a burden of proof. See infra notes 222-224
and accompanying text.
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requisite standard presumably would be based on some default as
determined by state law (whether statute, regulation, or case law).
But it seems appropriate to apply the requisite standard of proof,
whatever it may be, in a manner consistent with the above de
scribed trends, so as to not vitiate the meaningful remedy intended
by these statutes.220
Some statutes follow both trends. Under New York’s statute,
the court, upon “find[ing] that the claimant is entitled to a judg
ment, . . . shall award damages in such sum of money as the court
determines will fairly and reasonably compensate him.”221 The
West Virginia statute contains a similar provision.222 The legislative
findings in these statutes require courts to “give due consideration”
to evidentiary shortcomings in the “interest of justice” when evalu
ating compensation claims. 223 In like manner, under the Louisiana
statute, in making its determination on actual innocence and com
pensation, “[t]he court may consider any relevant evidence regard
less of whether it was admissible in, or excluded from, the criminal
trial in which the applicant was convicted.”224 Through fixing
awards on a temporal basis, the court is to further “order payment”
for medical care, job training, and educational services as it “finds
reasonable and appropriate.”225
Several statutes of other states also speak in terms of reasona
bleness or fairness, or provide the judge or agency at least some
discretion in calculating the award. The Wisconsin claims board
220. See supra Part II.A
221. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011).
222. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g) (LexisNexis 2009).
223. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C (West 2009); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2
13a(a). Based on the surrounding text, this statement appears particularly geared to
ward the burden of proving actual innocence. But it seems pervaded by an equitable
spirit “regarding the weight and admissibility of evidence” in general in compensation
suits. Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D §§ 1(F), 5(A) (2008) (granting the trier
of fact similar leeway in assessing evidence, and also stating that evidence should not be
excluded on several federal or state constitutional grounds; provision appearing in the
introductory section of the statute, which deals mostly with the threshold requirement
of proving innocence, and not explicitly referring to the determination of damages; a
later provision provides significant discretion in determining “fair[ ]” and “reason
abl[e]” damages).
224. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(D) (Supp. 2011).
225. Id. § 15:572.8(H), amended by 2011 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285)
(West); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:10 (2007). Under New Hampshire’s
statute, the Board of Claims “shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of
evidence, but may admit all testimony having a reasonable probative value.” Id. § 541
B:10(II). When “the board by majority vote finds that payment to a claimant is justi
fied,” “the governor shall draw [a] warrant for said payment out of any money in the
state treasury.” Id. § 541-B:13.
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“shall find the amount which will equitably compensate the peti
tioner, not to exceed $25,000.”226 Tennessee’s Board of Claims
shall “consider[ ] . . . all factors . . . relevant including, but not lim
ited to, the person’s physical and mental suffering and loss of earn
ings.”227 Like Louisiana, Alabama has preconfigured award
amounts but also provides a means for expanding the award: the
Committee on Compensation for Wrongful Conviction may recom
mend “additional compensation” as warranted “from the evi
dence.” 228 The District of Columbia statute states, rather plainly,
that “[u]pon a finding by the judge of unjust imprisonment . . . the
judge may award damages.”229
Other statutes refer to damages being equal or commensurate
to losses actually incurred due to the wrongful conviction and im
prisonment. Under the Maryland statute, for example, the Board
of Public Works may grant an individual “an amount commensu
rate with the actual damages sustained by the individual.”230 In
Ohio, a person is “irrebuttably presumed to be a wrongfully impris
oned individual” for purposes of receiving compensation once the
requisite judicial determination is received.231 The claimant must
then present “requisite proof” of fines, attorneys’ fees, court costs,
lost wages, and other losses to receive a sum of money equal to his
or her damages.232
Prior to the recent repeal of its statute, Texas was the only state
which expressly provided a burden of proof in judicial proceedings
for calculating the compensation award.233 Before the comptroller
in an administrative proceeding,234 “[t]he petitioner must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to
compensation and the amount of compensation to which petitioner is
entitled.”235 Under this statute, the burden of proof was treated the
226. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009). But see supra note 188.
227. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (Supp. 2011).
228. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(c) (LexisNexis 2003).
229. D.C. CODE § 2-423 (LexisNexis 2008).
230. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009)
(“[Board also] may grant a reasonable amount for any financial or other appropriate
counseling for the individual, due to the confinement.”).
231. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
232. Id. § 2743.48(E)(2).
233. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN § 103.102 (West 2011), repealed by 2009
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 180 § 12(2)7 (West).
234. See Id. § 103.051(b)(2).
235. Id. § 103.102, repealed by 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 180 § 12(2)7 (West)
(emphasis added); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2011) (burden of proof not
explicit, but “pecuniary injury” must be demonstrated in order to receive damages).
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same for the determination of innocence and calculation of
compensation.
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute
As with the large majority of compensation statutes, the pro
posed statute does not adopt a specific standard of proof in the
compensation stage. Instead the presumption is that the standard
will be consistent with what is required in any judicial or adminis
trative proceeding to recover damages from the state. This ap
proach will avoid confusion about which standard to apply and will
avoid having two evidentiary standards, one for innocent inmates
and one for all other parties who claim they have been injured by
the state. The applicable standard should be construed so as to ef
fectuate the remedial purpose of the statute: to provide fair and
equitable awards to wrongfully imprisoned persons despite poten
tial constraints in the presentation of evidence.
E. Issuance of Declaration of Actual Innocence
The proposed statute permits an individual whose conviction
has been reversed to apply for the issuance of a declaration of ac
tual innocence. This will enable individuals whose convictions are
reversed on procedural grounds to establish that they were actually
innocent of the crime for which they were convicted and impris
oned. Many courts will not address the issue of innocence if there is
a procedural ground to set aside the conviction. A significant num
ber of persons, for this reason, would be precluded from receiving
compensation in the absence of this provision. This provision pro
vides an effective cure to a potential deficiency in the technical
exoneration.
Actual innocence must be established by “clear and convincing
evidence.”236 This standard is applicable to the “ordinary” judicial
determination of actual innocence under the statute such as where a
conviction is reversed because the individual, in fact, did not com
mit the crime.237 A declaration of actual innocence satisfies the
same procedural prerequisites as do other judicial exonerations (as
well as executive pardons) based on actual innocence, and is func
tionally equivalent for purposes of the statute.
236.
237.

See supra Part II.B.5.b.
See supra Part II.B.4.
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III.

PROPOSED STATUTE

As discussed in the previous section, twenty-four states, the
District of Columbia, and the federal government have statutes
governing compensation for individuals who are wrongfully impris
oned. Although some of these statutes are of recent origin, others
were enacted more than twenty years ago. Given the diversity of
these statutes and the wealth of provisions governing every aspect
of awarding compensation, a proposed statute should borrow from
previously enacted statutes with modification necessary for fairness
and to provide just compensation.
The proposed statute contains alternate sections depending on
whether a state decides to use a judicial or administrative determi
nation of innocence. The drafters of this article have concluded
that each model has its own benefits.
AN ACT

COMPENSATE INNOCENT INDIVIDUALS
WRONGFULLY IMPRISONED

TO

Section 1. Legislative Findings
The Legislature finds and declares that innocent individuals
who have been wrongfully imprisoned have been frustrated in seek
ing legal redress and that such individuals should have an available
avenue of redress over and above the existing tort remedies to seek
compensation for damages. By enactment of the provisions of this
chapter, the Legislature intends that those innocent individuals who
can demonstrate that they were wrongfully imprisoned be able to
recover damages against the State.
1. Innocent individuals who were imprisoned but were not
convicted have an avenue of redress under this Act over and
above the existing tort remedies.238
2. In light of the burden of proof that must be carried by such
individuals, it is the intent of the Legislature that the courts,
in exercising their discretion as permitted by law regarding
the weight and admissibility of evidence submitted pursuant
to this chapter, may, in the interest of justice, give due con
sideration to difficulties of proof caused by the passage of
time, the death or unavailability of witnesses, the destruc
238.

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(a) (LexisNexis 2009).
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tion of evidence or other factors not caused by such individ
uals or those acting on their behalf.239
Section 2. Individuals Eligible for Relief
An individual who meets all of the following criteria is eligible
for relief under this Act:
1. the individual has been wrongfully imprisoned for any crim
inal offense contained in the laws of this state or any subdi
vision thereof, and240
2. the individual can prove that he or she is actually innocent
of the criminal offense for which he or she was wrongfully
imprisoned in the following manner: (i) in the case of a par
don, a determination was made pursuant to law by the par
don and parole board or by the governor that the offense
for which the individual was imprisoned, including any
lesser included offenses arising out of the same facts and
circumstances, was not committed by the individual; or (ii)
in the case of judicial relief, a court of competent jurisdic
tion has issued a declaration of actual innocence pursuant to
section 10 of this Act or has found by clear and convincing
evidence that the offense for which the individual was im
prisoned, including any such lesser included offenses, was
not committed by the individual and issued an order vacat
ing, dismissing, or reversing the charges or conviction and
sentence and providing that no further proceedings can or
will be held against the individual on any facts and circum
stances alleged in the proceedings which had resulted in the
imprisonment.241
Section 3. Exclusions from Eligibility
An individual shall not be eligible to receive compensation
under this chapter if such individual:
1. was also serving a concurrent sentence for a crime not cov
ered by this statute; provided, however, that this exception
shall not apply to a claimant who would not have been in
carcerated on the concurrent sentence but for the conviction
covered by this statute; and provided further, that this exclu
239. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1 (West 2009); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(a) (LexisNexis 2009).
240. See D.C. CODE § 2-421 (LexisNexis 2008).
241. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 154(B)(2)(e)(1), (2) (West 2008).
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sion shall not apply to any period of incarceration due to the
conviction covered by this statute that exceeds the term of
imprisonment imposed on the claimant for the concurrent
sentence, or if no such term was imposed by a court, the
statutory maximum for the term of such concurrent
sentence;242
2. was the subject of an act of the legislature that authorized
an award of compensation for his or her wrongful imprison
ment and the individual has received the award;243
3. by any act or omission related to the conduct of the alleged
offense at the time and/or place of occurrence of the alleged
offense, or by falsely giving an uncoerced confession of
guilt, committing or suborning perjury, or fabricating evi
dence, caused or brought about his or her wrongful
imprisonment.244
Section 4. Jurisdiction. [Judicial Relief]
A civil action for damages under this chapter shall be brought
in the court of claims [or in the superior court or district court] that
has jurisdiction under the laws of this state to hear actions for dam
ages against the state. Such actions shall be governed by the rules
of civil procedure applicable to such proceedings, except as other
wise provided by this chapter.245
Alt. Section 4. Jurisdiction [Administrative Relief]
A proceeding for compensation under this chapter shall be
brought before the board of claims [or administrative body] that
has jurisdiction under the laws of this state to hear claims against
the state and shall be governed by the rules of administrative proce
dure applicable to such proceedings,246 except as otherwise pro
vided by this chapter.
242. See id.; ABA Report, supra note 35, at 1.
243. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-161 (LexisNexis 2003).
244. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01
195.10(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011); Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra note 35,
§ 4(A)(2); see also supra note 66.
245. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 3 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.48(D) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
246. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 29-2-154; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:10 (2007).
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Section 5. Wrongful Imprisonment–Cause of Action [Judicial
Relief]
1. The state consents to be sued by a person who has been
imprisoned where such imprisonment was wrongful, and to
liability on its part because of that fact, only as provided in
this chapter. However, nothing in this chapter shall affect
any liability of the state or of its employees to a wrongfully
imprisoned individual on a claim for relief that is not based
on the fact of wrongful imprisonment, including a claim for
relief that arises out of circumstances occurring during the
wrongfully imprisoned individual’s confinement in a state or
local correctional institution.247
2. A civil action may be brought against the state by an indi
vidual who was wrongfully imprisoned if such individual sat
isfies all of the eligibility requirements of section two and is
not barred by any of the exclusions from eligibility in sec
tion three. In such action the individual may establish that
he or she is a wrongfully imprisoned individual by (a) sub
mitting a certified copy of the determination of the pardon
and parole board or the governor that the offense for which
the individual was imprisoned, including any lesser included
offenses, was not committed by the individual; or (b) by
submitting a certified copy of the entry of the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction, determining that based on
clear and convincing evidence the offense for which the in
dividual was imprisoned, including any lesser included of
fenses, was not committed by the individual, and that such
charges or conviction and sentence shall be or has been re
versed or dismissed, and that no further proceeding can or
may be held against the individual based on any facts and
circumstances alleged in the proceedings which resulted in
the wrongful imprisonment. No other evidence shall be re
quired of the individual to establish that he or she is a
wrongfully imprisoned individual, and the individual shall
be irrebuttably presumed to be a wrongfully imprisoned
individual.248
3. In such action, if the court finds that the wrongfully impris
oned individual has satisfied the requirements of subdivision
two, the court shall award damages in such sum of money as
247. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(F)(3).
248. See § 2743.48(E)(1).
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the court determines will fairly and reasonably compensate
such individual,249 including but not limited to:
i. the amount of any fine, surcharge, other penalty or court
costs imposed and paid, and any reasonable attorneys’
fees and other expenses incurred by the wrongfully im
prisoned individual in connection with all associated
criminal proceedings and appeals, if applicable, in con
nection with obtaining the wrongfully imprisoned indi
vidual’s discharge from confinement in a state or local
correctional institution, and any fees and expenses in
curred in connection with any civil actions and proceed
ings for post-conviction relief which are related to the
wrongful imprisonment;250
ii. an amount to compensate the individual for each full
year of imprisonment or a pro-rata amount for each part
of a year so imprisoned, including, but not limited to,
considering the individual’s physical and mental suffer
ing,251 and taking into account the length and conditions
under which the individual was imprisoned and any
other factors deemed appropriate to compensate fairly
the individual for such imprisonment,252 including prison
labor and involuntary servitude;
iii. any loss of wages, salary, or other earned income that
directly resulted from the wrongfully imprisoned indi
vidual’s arrest, prosecution, conviction, and wrongful
imprisonment;253
iv. any user’s fees or copayments recovered from such indi
vidual for services rendered while in the custody of a
correctional institution, including, but not limited to,
medical care, housing, supervision, or any other ancillary
services.254
4. In awarding compensation under this section, a court shall
not offset the award by any expenses incurred by the state
or any political subdivision of the state in connection with
the arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of the individual,
249. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g) (LexisNexis 2009).
250. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(6)(a) (West 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.48(E)(2).
251. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (1999 & Supp. 2011).
252. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(A) (2008).
253. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2)(c).
254. See § 2743.48(E)(2)(d)(i)-(iii).
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including, but not limited to, expenses for food, clothing,
shelter, or medical care; nor shall the court offset the award
by the value of the reduction in tuition or fees for educa
tional services or the value of other services to be provided
to the wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to this
chapter.255
5. In such civil action the wrongfully imprisoned individual
shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, and in addition
to the award of monetary damages provided in section two,
such individual shall also be entitled to reasonable attor
neys’ fees.256
6. A judgment or award of damages pursuant to this chapter
may not include punitive or exemplary damages.257
Alt. Section 5. Wrongful Imprisonment–Proceeding for
Compensation [Administrative Relief]
1. An individual who was wrongfully imprisoned may bring a
proceeding before the board of claims [or appropriate ad
ministrative body] if such individual satisfies all of the eligi
bility requirements of section two of this chapter and is not
excluded from eligibility by any of the provisions of section
three of this chapter. In such proceeding the individual may
establish that he or she is a wrongfully imprisoned individ
ual by (a) submitting a certified copy of the determination
of the pardon and parole board or the governor that the
offense for which the individual was convicted, sentenced
and imprisoned, including any lesser included offenses, was
not committed by the individual; or (b) by submitting a cer
tified copy of the entry of a judgment of a court of compe
tent jurisdiction, determining that based on clear and
convincing evidence the offense for which the individual
was wrongfully imprisoned, including any lesser included of
fenses, was not committed by the individual, and that such
charges or conviction and sentence has been dismissed or
reversed, and that no further proceeding can or may be held
255. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-160(d) (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 663A.1(7); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(B).
256. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(b) (West 2009). The criteria for calculating
attorneys’ fees may be found in subdivision 4 of Alt. Section 5.
257. See D.C. CODE § 2-423 (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 8242(3) (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(A); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,
§ 154(C) (West 2008).
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against the individual based on any facts and circumstances
alleged in the proceedings which resulted in the wrongful
imprisonment. No other evidence shall be required of the
individual to establish that he or she is a wrongfully impris
oned individual, and the individual shall be irrebuttably pre
sumed to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual.258
2. If the board of claims finds that the wrongfully imprisoned
individual is eligible for relief and is not excluded from eligi
bility, the board may award such sum of money as it deter
mines will equitably259 compensate such individual,
including but not limited to:
i. the amount of any fine, surcharge, other penalty or court
costs imposed and paid, and any reasonable attorneys’
fees and other expenses incurred by the wrongfully im
prisoned individual in connection with all associated
criminal proceedings and appeals, if applicable, in con
nection with obtaining the wrongfully imprisoned indi
vidual’s discharge from confinement in a state or local
correctional institution, and any fees and expenses in
curred in connection with any civil actions and proceed
ings for post-conviction relief which are related to the
wrongful imprisonment;
ii. an amount to compensate the individual for each full
year of imprisonment or a pro-rata amount for each part
of a year so imprisoned, considering all the factors the
board considers relevant, including, but not limited to,
the individual’s physical and mental suffering,260 and
taking into account the length and conditions under
which the individual was imprisoned and any other fac
tors deemed appropriate to fairly compensate the indi
vidual for such imprisonment, including prison labor and
involuntary servitude;
iii. any loss of wages, salary, or other earned income that
directly resulted from the wrongfully imprisoned indi
vidual’s arrest, prosecution, conviction and wrongful
imprisonment;
iv. any user’s fees or copayments recovered from such indi
vidual for services rendered while in the custody of a
258. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(1).
259. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009).
260. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (Supp. 2011).
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correctional institution, including, but not limited to
medical care, housing, supervision or any other ancillary
services.
3. In awarding a sum of money under this section, the board
shall not offset the award by any expenses incurred by the
state or any political subdivision of the state in connection
with the arrest, prosecution and imprisonment of the indi
vidual, including, but not limited to, expenses for food,
clothing, shelter or medical care; nor shall the court offset
the award by the value of the reduction in tuition or fees for
educational services or the value of other services to be pro
vided to the wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to
this chapter.
4. In such proceeding the wrongfully imprisoned individual
shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, and in addition
to the award of monetary damages provided in section two,
such individual shall also be entitled to reasonable attor
neys’ fees. In determining the amount of allowable fees, the
board of claims shall consider, among other things, the na
ture, length, and complexity of the services performed, the
usual and customary charge for work of like kind, and the
benefits resulting to the wrongfully imprisoned individual as
a result of the legal services performed.261 Attorney fees
shall not be awarded to lawyers who have been compen
sated for providing representation to the wrongfully impris
oned individual.
5. A judgment or award of damages pursuant to this chapter
may not include punitive or exemplary damages.262
Section 6. Additional Relief
1. The court [or the board of claims] may include as part of its
determination an order requiring the state to provide the
wrongfully imprisoned individual with any services that are
reasonable and necessary to address any of the deficiencies
in the individual’s physical and emotional condition that are
shown to be directly related to the individual’s wrongful im
prisonment through documentary or oral evidence submit
ted to the court [or the board of claims] by the individual as
261. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:18 (2007).
262. See D.C. CODE § 2-423; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8242(3); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, § 5(A); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(C).
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part of his or her claim for compensation under this chapter,
including, but not limited to, the nature of the services the
individual seeks, and the agencies of the state from which
the individual seeks or may seek to receive such services.263
Any such agency so named in the claim shall receive reason
able notice from the court [or the board of claims] of the
proceedings pertaining to the possible ordering of such ser
vices and shall be given an opportunity to be heard on
whether such agency is the appropriate entity to provide
such services if so ordered.264
2. The court [or the board of claims] may also include in its
determination an order entitling a wrongfully imprisoned in
dividual to receive educational aid and services at state ex
pense. Aid under this section shall include expenses for
tuition, fees, books, board and room at any state funded uni
versity or college or any community college, and shall in
clude assistance in meeting any admission standards or
criteria required at such institutions, including, but not lim
ited to, assistance in satisfying requirements for a certificate
of equivalency of completion of secondary education and
assistance in completing any adult education program or
courses.265
3. The privilege of receiving educational aid under subdivision
two shall remain active for ten years after the release of the
wrongfully imprisoned individual who qualifies for such aid,
and such aid shall continue for up to a total of five years of
aid within the ten year period or until the degree or pro
gram for which the individual receives aid is completed,
whichever is less, as long as the individual continues to
make satisfactory progress in the course or program at
tempted. Aid shall be provided for completion of any de
gree or program available at the institutions listed in
subdivision two, at the individual’s choice.266
4. If requested by the wrongfully convicted individual, the
state department of mental health shall provide appropriate
counseling to the individual at a mutually agreed-on loca
tion at no charge to the individual.267
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See
See
See
See
See

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(A).
id.
id; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-214(1), (2) (2009).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214(4).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(c) (West 2011).
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5. If requested by the individual, the state shall pay the costs of
job-skills training for one year.268
6. The court [or the board of claims] may also include in its
determination an order entitling a wrongfully imprisoned in
dividual to receive child support payments owed by the
claimant that became due, and interest on child support ar
rearages that accrued, during the time served in prison but
were not paid.269
Section 7. Methods of Payment; Eligibility of Estate to Receive
Compensation
1. The court [or the board of claims] in its discretion may di
rect payment of compensation in lump sum, installments, or
in annuity payments270 as it deems appropriate, but no part
of such compensation shall be directed to any person other
than the individual so pardoned or exonerated, nor shall the
individual so pardoned or exonerated pay any part of the
sum received to any persons for services rendered in con
nection with its collection, provided, however, that this sec
tion shall not preclude any contingent fee arrangement with
counsel that is permitted under state law or local court
rule.271 In determining whether to commute the compensa
tion to a lump sum payment, the court [or the board of
claims] shall consider whether there exists special needs
warranting such payment, whether it will be in the best in
terests of the individual and whether that individual has the
ability to wisely manage and control the commuted award
irrespective of whether there exist special needs.272
2. Annuity payments, if granted, shall be based on a present
value sum equal to the total amount of the award. The an
nuity payments are payable in equal monthly installments
for the life of the claimant and must be based on market
interest rate per annum and other actuarial factors within
the court’s [or the board of claims’] discretion. The annuity
payments may not be accelerated, deferred, increased, or
268. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011), amended by
2011 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West).
269. Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, § 4(B)(4).
270. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 103.053.
271. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-160 (LexisNexis 2003); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN.
& PROC. §§ 10-501(c), (d)(1)(2) (LexisNexis 2009).
272. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(D) (Supp. 2011).
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decreased. The applicant may not sell, mortgage or other
wise encumber, or anticipate the payments, wholly or partly,
by assignment or otherwise.273
3. In the event that the individual awarded compensation dies
prior to receiving the full amount of his or her compensa
tion, the individual’s estate shall be eligible to receive any
remaining compensation.274
4. Any right to apply for compensation under this chapter shall
cease upon the death of the wrongfully imprisoned individ
ual if the individual is not survived by any family members
or domestic partners who were dependent upon the individ
ual prior to the individual’s wrongful imprisonment, but if
such individual has commenced a civil action or administra
tive proceeding for compensation pursuant to section five of
this chapter prior to his or her death, the estate of such indi
vidual shall be eligible to receive said compensation.275 In
the case of a posthumous exoneration of an innocent indi
vidual, a family member [spouse, child, parent, sibling, or a
domestic partner as defined by the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the partner resided] of an innocent individual shall
have the right to seek compensation under this section for
the loss of financial support or companionship caused by the
individual’s wrongful imprisonment.
Section 8. Statute of Limitations
1. An action [or administrative proceeding] under this chapter
shall be commenced within three years276 of service on a
wrongfully imprisoned individual of a determination by the
board of pardon and parole or by the governor that the of
fense for which such individual was wrongfully imprisoned,
including any lesser included offenses, was not committed
by the individual; within three years of service on a wrong
fully imprisoned individual of the entry of judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction determining that the offense
for which the individual was wrongfully imprisoned, includ
273. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.053.
274. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-160.
275. See id.
276. See § 29-2-162; IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(8) (West 1998); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 258D § 8 (2008); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(7) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(H) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-13a(h) (LexisNexis 2009).
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ing any lesser included offenses, was not committed by the
individual, and ordering that the charges or conviction and
sentence of such individual be dismissed or reversed, and
further ordering that no further proceedings can or may be
held against the individual on any facts and circumstances
alleged in the proceeding which had resulted in the convic
tion; an individual wrongfully imprisoned and released
from custody prior to the effective date of this act shall com
mence an action within five years of the effective date of
this act.277
2. The three-year period under this section shall toll if the indi
vidual who was wrongfully imprisoned shows by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she could not file suit under
this Act due to health-related conditions, including mental
disabilities, or other justifiable hardships.
3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, failure to file
any applicable Notice of Claim shall not bar filing of a claim
under this Act.278
Section 9. Notification of Right to Commence a Civil Action or
Administrative Proceeding
1. When a court [or pardon authority] determines that an indi
vidual is a wrongfully imprisoned individual or issues a dec
laration of actual innocence pursuant to section 10, the
court [or pardon authority] shall provide the individual with
a copy of this statute and orally inform the individual and
his or her attorney of the individual’s rights under this stat
ute to commence a civil action against the state in the courts
[or administrative agency] of this state because of the indi
vidual’s wrongful imprisonment and to be represented in a
civil action [or administrative proceeding] by counsel of the
individual’s own choice.
2. The court [or pardon authority] described in subdivision
one shall notify the clerk of the court in which a civil action
may be commenced [or the administrative agency], in writ
ing, within seven days of the entry of its determination, that
the individual is a wrongfully imprisoned individual, of the
name and proposed mailing address of the individual, and of
the fact that the person has the rights to commence a civil
277.
278.

See Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, § 6.
See id.
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action [or administrative proceeding] and to have legal rep
resentation as provided in this section. The clerk of the
court in which a civil action may be commenced [or the ad
ministrative agency] shall maintain in the clerk’s office [or
agency’s office] a list of wrongfully imprisoned individuals
for whom notices are received under this section and shall
create files in the clerk’s office [or the agency’s office] for
each such individual.279
Section 10. Issuance of Declaration of Actual Innocence
1. A wrongfully imprisoned individual whose conviction has
been reversed or vacated, or against whom charges have
been dismissed, on grounds other than actual innocence
may petition a court of competent jurisdiction for a declara
tion of actual innocence. The petition shall be heard by a
civil or criminal court in the judicial district in which the
individual was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.
The petition shall contain all of the relevant allegations of
fact known to the petitioner at the time of filing, including
all relevant documents and test results, and shall enumerate
and include all relevant previous records, applications, peti
tions, appeals, and their dispositions. A copy of the petition
shall be served on the prosecuting attorney who prosecuted
the individual’s criminal case, and such prosecuting attor
ney, if available, shall appear on behalf of the state.
2. Upon consideration of the petition and the response by the
state, the previous records in the case, and the record of any
hearing held by the court in connection with the petition,
the court may either summarily dismiss the petition for fail
ure to state a claim or assert grounds upon which relief shall
be granted; or upon a finding that the petitioner has, based
on petition submitted under the preceding subsection,
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the offense for
which the individual was wrongfully imprisoned, including
any such lesser included offenses, was not committed by the
individual, the court may issue a declaration of actual inno
cence as a judgment of the court. Such declaration and
judgment shall satisfy the requirements of section five of
279.

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.48(B)(1), (2).
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this Act with respect to the filing of an action or proceeding
for compensation.280
Section 11. Right of Appeal
Any party is entitled to the rights of appeal afforded parties in
a civil action following a decision on such motions as set forth in
section [XX] of said Chapter [XXX] of the [State] code.
CONCLUSION
Society is morally obligated to financially compensate and pro
vide services to those who were wrongfully imprisoned. The system
must compensate those who have fallen victim to its inadequacies.
This article suggests that states without compensation statutes
adopt the proposed recommended statute. Since the proposed stat
ute takes provisions from statutes currently in use, it provides a
common and workable approach to provide just and fair compensa
tion to the exonerees. Although a legislature might fine-tune the
requirements, the recommended statute in this article offers a pre
liminary framework for a state that does not currently have a stat
ute to compensate the wrongfully imprisoned.

280.

See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.10-13 (2008).

